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Abstract 
Today there is an increased awareness of the importance of forests, which has caused much 
political interest in forestry. Therefore, there is a need for forest owner to protect their 
property rights. The largest forestry cooperative in Sweden, Södra, works to improve market 
conditions for the membership by promoting changes in policy to the advantage of forest 
owners, hence, lobbying activities.  
The problem addressed in this study is that the cooperative’s lobbying benefits also non-
members, while the members pay by abstaining from possible dividends. The members’ 
willingness to pay is unknown. Likewise, it is difficult to predict whether the outcome of 
lobbying will be successful or not. The lobbying can, therefore, be costly with limited or no 
returns.  
The aim of this study is to explore the members’ incentives and disincentives to accept the 
forestry cooperative Södra using its collective funds for lobbying activities. Core issues are 
the members’ knowledge and beliefs of Södra’s lobbying activities, their appreciation of 
Södra as a tool for lobbying and their understanding of the relationship between individual 
and collective action. It includes the support of lobbying activities performed by Södra and 
the incentives to accept the costs for those activities.  
Södra is a cooperative and therefore collectively owned and governed. To understand how 
individuals interact in a collective context, the Theory of Collective Action is used. In 
addition to the behaviour of individuals in a collective organisation, the theory explains the 
use of public goods, which results from forests and other natural resources. Because 
cooperatives are collectively governed, the members have vaguely defined property rights, 
which can affect the members’ acceptance of investments in lobbying. Hence, Property Rights 
Theory is included in the theoretical framework.  
A quantitative research approach is used since a large number of empirical data is needed. 
The data is collected through a web survey, using a questionnaire. The survey is performed in 
collaboration with Södra. E-mail with an internet link to the questionnaire was sent to 5.000 
randomly selected members of Södra.  
The results indicate that most members believe that they get individual benefits from allowing 
Södra to invest in lobbying activities. The fulfilment of the members' interests constitutes an 
incentive to accept that collective funds are invested in lobbying. Social interaction within the 
membership and communication with Södra’s business organisation contribute to the 
incentives to accept the investments. Non-members’ free riding behaviour and members’ 
limited planning horizons are not considered as disincentives. Neither uncertainty with 
lobbying is a disincentive to accept collective investments.  
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Sammanfattning 
Idag finns en ökad medvetenhet om skogens betydelse, vilket innebär skiftande åsikter om hur 
skogen ska hanteras. Därmed finns det ett ökat behov för skogsägarna att skydda sina 
äganderätter. Genom gemensamt agerande, exempelvis som medlem i ett kooperativ, har en 
skogsägare större möjlighet att påverka politiska beslut. Södra är det största svenska 
kooperativet för skogsägare. Föreningen arbetar för att förbättra markägares förutsättningar 
genom att engagera sig i påverkansarbete till fördel för skogsägarna, det vill säga 
lobbyverksamhet.  
Studiens problem är att lobbying är kostsamt för kooperativet och därmed för medlemmarna, 
eftersom dessa möjligen tvingas avstå från utdelning till förmån för kollektiva investeringar i 
lobbyverksamhet. Dock är medlemmarnas betalningsvilja okänd. Dessutom är det svårt att 
förutspå vilket resultat lobbyverksamheten kommer att ge. Därmed kan dessa investeringar bli 
kostsamma utan garanterat resultat.  
Syftet med studien är att undersöka medlemmarnas incitament att acceptera att Södra 
investerar kollektivt kapital i lobbyverksamhet, trots att medlemmar och icke-medlemmar får 
lika stor nytta av denna lobbying. Studien är inriktad på medlemmarnas kunskap och åsikt om 
lobbyverksamheten, deras bedömning av Södra som ett redskap för lobbying och deras 
förståelse för relationen mellan individuellt och kollektivt agerande. Detta inkluderar stödet 
för lobbyverksamhet samt incitamenten att acceptera kostnaden för denna verksamhet.  
Södra är ett kooperativ och därmed kollektivt ägt och styrt. För att förstå hur individer 
interagerar i en kollektiv organisation är teorin om kollektivt handlande lämplig. Förutom 
individers beteende i en kollektiv organisation förklarar teorin användningen av kollektiva 
nyttigheter, till exempel skog och andra naturresurser. I en kollektivt ägd organisation har 
medlemmarna vagt definierade äganderätter, vilket kan påverka deras inställning till 
investeringar i lobbyverksamhet. På grund av detta inkluderas även teorin om äganderätter i 
det teoretiska ramverket.  
En kvantitativ metod är lämplig då studien kräver ett stort antal empiriska data. Data är 
insamlad genom en enkätundersökning i samarbete med Södra. Ett frågeformulär skickades 
via e-mail till 5000 slumpmässigt utvalda Södramedlemmar.  
Slutsatsen är att de flesta av Södras medlemmar upplever sig få individuella fördelar med att 
låta Södra bedriva lobbyverksamhet. Genom att Södra tillgodoser medlemmarna intressen 
skapas incitament att acceptera att kollektivt kapital investeras i lobbyverksamhet. Social 
interaktion inom medlemskåren samt annan kommunikation inom organisationen skapar 
ytterligare incitament. Medlemmarna anser inte att icke-medlemmarnas 
gratispassagerarbeteende eller tidsbegränsat medlemskap är hinder för investeringen. Inte 
heller osäkerhet gällande investeringar i lobbying utgör ett hinder för att acceptera Södras 
lobbying.  
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1 
1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the topic for this research. The problem background and problem are 
presented and further analysed to define the aim of the study. The chapter ends with the 
study’s outline. 
1.1 Problem background 
The forestry industry developed during the 19th century and had a significant impact on 
Swedish economy (Skogsstyrelsen, 2013). Forestry is one of the largest industries in Sweden 
and an important part of Swedish exports (www, Skogsindustrierna 1, 2017). The current net 
export corresponds to nine billion euro, which is more than the entire Swedish trade balance 
(Pers. com. Tibblin, 2018). Approximately 55 percent of the total land in Sweden consists of 
productive forest, which corresponds to about 22 millions of hectares (Skogsstyrelsen, 2013). 
Of this productive forest, one million hectares are legally protected; both to ensure public 
access to the forest but also as a habitation of certain species. 
The ownership of Swedish forests is divided between private owners, companies and the state 
(Skogsstyrelsen, 2013). The private properties, most family forestry, accounts for 
approximately 330,000 individuals and together they possess fifty percent of the total area of 
productive forestland. The average size of the private properties is 45 hectares. The second 
largest owner group is private limited companies, for example, Holmen and SCA, who own 
about 25 percent of the productive forest (Skogsstyrelsen, 2014). Svea Skog AB, which is a 
limited company owned by the Swedish government, is the third largest forest owner and 
possesses 14 percent of the productive forest (Skogsstyrelsen, 2013). Other private owners 
own the remaining part, for instance, the Swedish Church, the government, municipalities, 
and country councils. 
Traditionally, the Swedish forest has been managed by the landowners without involvement 
from external stakeholders (LRF, 2016). Forest owners have had freedom with responsibility 
to cultivate and responsibly manage their land. However, today there is an increased 
awareness of the importance of forest, and the interest in the forest has spread to other 
stakeholders. These other stakeholders have different opinions regarding how the forest 
should be managed to ensure that the forest remains for future generations, which results in 
conflicts of interest (LRF Skogsägarna, 2014). The debate about the use of forest has 
intensified over the last years and therefore gained more space in media (LRF, 2014). Some 
of the major issues discussed in the forestry sector are as follows: 
The increasingly intensive forestry is a threat to biodiversity (Skogsstyrelsen, 2013). When 
the forestry expands, it affects the habitation of numerous species (www, Naturvårdsverket 2, 
2018). The habitat for species, plants, and sponges deteriorate or disappear by the 
industrialism and intensified forestry. Therefore, there is an interest in conservation of the 
forest due to biodiversity. This interest influences the debate and in the long run the forest 
owners’ property rights.  
A system to protect biodiversity is the establishment of key habitats (www, Skogsstyrelsen 1, 
2018). Key habitats refer to areas of land with special values that need extra protection since 
these cannot manage the intensified forestry. The decision to introduce such a protected area 
is made by The Swedish Forest Agencies, which is a governmental agency. When the 
Swedish Forest Agencies has decided to establish a key habitat, the forest owner cannot 
appeal against the decision and are no longer allowed to deforest within this area (FSC, 2018). 
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International stakeholder influence the forestry sector because of Sweden’s membership in 
EU (www, Skogssällskapet 1, 2017). One legislation from EU that has had an impact on 
Swedish forestry is the Species Protection Regulation. The purpose is to preserve animal and 
plant species due to climate changes. This legislation was implemented in Swedish law in 
2008 and has limited the deforestation.  
 
The right of public access is a Swedish tradition, which results in public interest in the forest 
and forestry (www, Naturvårdsverket 1, 2018). The public interest is related to an increased 
interest in authenticity, nature, and health where the forest is an essential factor (LRF 
Skogsägarna, 2014). People travel to the forest to spend their leisure time close to nature for 
recreation and outdoor life. This right is individual, but there is an increased trend in activities 
for commercial purposes like eco-tourism. Today no legislation states the terms of this 
phenomenon, which means that it is not illegal to organise activities or events without the 
landowners’ approval.  
 
The forest is a resource that should be used but not overexploited (www, Södra 1, 2018). 
Therefore, a forest owner is interested in both production and conservation to ensure 
continued forestry (Pers. com. Tibblin, 2018). The problem for the forest owners is that they 
might be limited in their right to make independent decisions regarding their forest due to 
other stakeholders and legislation. This limitation affects both economic aspects and 
individual independence. Agencies can confiscate the forestland for the conservation of 
certain species or the protection of valuable forest areas. If the forestland is confiscated, the 
forest owner is not assured financial compensation (Pers. com. Tibblin, 2018). The 
confiscation negatively affects the value of the forest property and the forest owners’ profit 
potential (LRF Skogsägarna, 2014). Thus, the independence of each forest owner is reduced. 
In addition, it is hard for the forest owner to make long-term plans due to difficulties to 
predict the future regarding the risk of confiscation or new legislation.  
1.2 Problem  
As argued by the problem background, there is an increased need for the forest owners to 
protect their property rights. However, individuals that act alone on the market are weak 
against other stakeholders who have more power, e.g., the government and non-governmental 
organisations (Dunn, 1988). Individuals must use a lot of resources when attempting to 
influence the market and claim their rights (Dunn, 1988; Nilsson & Björklund, 2003). On this 
basis, the forest owner needs collaboration partners to gain more power. To achieve this, the 
forest owners can join together and handle issues collectively by a cooperative society. By 
joint effort, the individuals have a higher chance to influence political decisions regarding 
forestry. 
 
The largest forestry cooperative in Sweden is Södra Skogsägarna (Södra) with a membership 
of more than 50,000 forest owners (Södra, 2018). Södra processes and trades forest products, 
but the purpose is also to improve market conditions for the members by promoting changes 
in policy to the benefit of forest owners, hence lobbying activities. When direct government 
involvement increases within the agricultural sector, lobbying might become the furthermost 
important function of cooperatives (Staatz, 1987). The problem is though that lobbying is 
costly for the cooperative and thus for the members (Pers. com., Tibblin, 2018). On this basis, 
it is problematic that the members’ willingness-to-pay in not known. Likewise, it is difficult 
to predict whether the outcome of lobbying will be successful or not. The result is that the 
investment for lobbying can be costly with limited or no return.  
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Moreover, forestry is a specific industry in the sense that it is a long-term production 
(Skogsstyrelsen, 2013). This means that current members may be paying for something 
without knowing if the outcome will result in a higher value of the forestland or not. Future 
owners may perhaps not realise that the today’s lobbying has made the forest more valuable 
(Pers. com., Tibblin, 2018). It is unknown how the market value of the forest will be affected 
by the lobbying that Södra is involved in. The value is related to the property right and the 
ability for the owners to decide how to use their forest. It is difficult to assess to which extent 
even successful lobbying activities may increase the value of forestland.  
 
Södra’s lobbying may benefit forest owners who are not members of Södra and therefore do 
not contribute financially to any lobbying activity. In case the lobbying activities contribute to 
better governmental policies, non-members will be gain just as much as the members will. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate a causal relation between Södra’s lobbying and the 
eventual changes in governmental policies.  
1.3 Problem analysis 
To establish the aim of this study, the problems mentioned in the previous section must be 
specified. The following problem analysis consists of conceptual clarifications and choice of 
perspective including delimitations, theoretical basis and empirical basis.  
 
1.3.1 Lobbying 
In general term, lobbying can be defined as an act of representation (Berry, 1977). A more 
precise definition is that lobbying is about influencing decision makers to achieve decisions in 
a certain direction (www, ne, 2018). This influence is either by putting pressure to change or 
to prevent a change in policy (Yadar, 2011). Milbrath (1963) provides a similar definition; 
 
“Lobbying is the stimulation and transmission of a communication, by someone other than a 
citizen acting on his own behalf, directed at a governmental decision-maker with the hope of 
influencing his decision” (Milbrath 1963, p. 8).  
 
Many people may associate the word lobbying with negative connotations. However, the 
word lobbying is used in this thesis because it is generally accepted. Södra uses the term 
business policy, which will be used during the collection of empirical data. Accordingly, 
business policy issues and lobbying refers to the same phenomenon. In the agricultural sector, 
it is common that individuals act collectively to redistribute property rights in society by 
direct involvement in the political system (Staatz, 1987). Lobbying is a powerful tool to 
influence certain decisions, but at the same time, the political outcome of lobbying is always 
uncertain (Kollman, 1998; Papaioannou et al., 2016). It is therefore impossible to predict if 
lobbying will be successful or not. Lobbying can be executed by industrial organisations, 
groups of individuals, specific firms and others (www, SVT, 2013). There is no legislation or 
regulation specifically for lobbying in Sweden.  
 
Södra is actively working with business policy issues, i.e., lobbying (Södra, 2018). The 
lobbying activities cover several areas, but the primary focus is favourable conditions for 
forestry in the south of Sweden, for the individual forest owner and the cooperative society 
Södra (www, Södra 2, 2018). The idea is that it is more effective to influence lobbying issues 
together than if the individual forest owner should act alone (Södra, 2017). Currently, there 
are issues that directly or indirectly affect both the individual forest owner and the collective 
industry. Large resources are invested in such activities (Pers. com., Tibblin, 2018). Some of 
the most critical issues today regard the forest owners’ property and decision- making rights. 
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1.3.2 Choice of perspective 
Cooperatives are business enterprises where the members own, manage and control the 
business (Dunn, 1988). This type of ownership structure aims at lowering the members’ 
transaction costs by protecting them from potentially deceptive business partners, which 
might have been the case if they were acting alone on the market (Nilsson, 2011). Despite 
this, several problems are related to the collective ownership, such as the balance between 
individual and collective interests. Because a cooperative must make sure that collective 
interests are aligned with the interests of individual members, the relationships between the 
members, and between the members and the management are essential.  
 
Since lobbying is by necessity a collective type of activity, it is vital that the management is 
aware of the members’ opinions. The outcome is unknown but at the same time costly. Hence, 
the main concern of this study is the members’ perception of Södra’s lobbying activities. 
Since there are no prior studies, this thesis can provide valuable insight into how members of 
Södra value the lobbying activities, as well as an investigation of the member’s perception of 
the collective or individual action.  
The study will contribute to the discussion about lobbying activities. The ambition is to 
provide insight into the members’ willingness to pay for lobbying and which incentives they 
have to accept the investments in lobbying. Hopefully, the study will be of use for Södra, the 
members of Södra and other interested stakeholders.  
1.3.3 Theoretical basis 
Several theoretical approaches are suitable to apply for this study. The topic could be 
approached as a political or psychological phenomenon, focusing on political analysis or the 
behaviour of the members as well as political decision-makers. Though it may be assumed 
that the economic considerations of the members have a decisive significance for the 
willingness to pay for lobbying, economic theory is more suitable. 
 
The main concern of this study is the incentives of the individual member of Södra. 
Therefore, theories used in this study are based on New Institutional Economics. Within this 
approach, there is an assumption that individuals are self-interest seeking but also that 
individuals are not capable of finding the optimal level of utility due to bounded rationality 
(Hardin, 1982; Williamson, 2000). Bounded rationality includes limited time, skills and other 
resources for the individual, which result in a situation where they are being exposed to 
another individuals’ deceitfulness. Nevertheless, the forest owners still choose to join a 
cooperative despite the risk that they need to put aside some individual interests. The tensions 
between individual and collective interests can be explained by the Theory of Collective 
Action.  
 
According to one branch of the Theory of Collective Action, assumptions meaning that there 
are limited opportunities for collective action (Olson, 1965). Another approach does, 
however, operative with less restrictive theoretical assumptions, such that the individuals live 
in a social context, whereby the interest of one individual may coincide with those of others, 
i.e., there may be social capital within a community of individuals (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
The tension between individual and collective interests might be rooted in property rights. 
The individuals have limited property rights to their collectively owned organisation, 
especially in a cooperative where property rights often are vaguely defined (Cook, 1995). 
Therefore, Property Rights Theory is included. The problem of vaguely defined property 
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rights is related to the incentives for the member to invest in collective activities such as 
lobbying. In a cooperative society, this results in conflicts and uncertainty because of the 
vaguely defined property rights. 
 
Social Capital Theory and Agency Theory concern the relationship among members of a 
cooperative but also the relationship between members and management. Being part of the 
New Institutional Economics paradigm, these theories are linked to the approaches mentioned 
above. Social Capital concerns social ties within a community of individuals (Feng, Friis & 
Nilsson, 2016). Trust and social relationships are related to the Theory of Collective Action. 
According to agency theory, several problems arise from the collectively owned organisation 
since ownership and management are separated which as well may be related to property 
rights (Cook, 1995).  
 
1.3.4 Empirical basis 
Since no previous studies have been made on forestry cooperatives members’ incentives to 
accept their cooperative’s lobbying investments, this study has an explorative approach. To 
investigate this, an empirical investigation is necessary. Conclusions from the theoretical 
framework are stated and tested in the empirical study, and later used for analyse and further 
discussion.  
 
Given that the study concerns the membership at large, it is necessary to collect data from a 
large number of members, which is to say that a survey among the members is to be 
conducted. It would be desirable to include all members of Södra in the selection frame, but 
that was found impossible regarding the number of members. Instead, the sample is limited to 
a randomly selected group of members, which are representative of the whole membership.  
1.4 Aim 
By the previous reasoning, the aim of the study is determined. 
 
The aim of the study is to explore the members’ incentives and disincentives to accept the 
forestry cooperative Södra using its collective funds for lobbying activities. 
 
Lobbying is a complex topic since Södra is a collectively owned organisation. Södra’s 
investments in lobbying is dependent on the members’ willingness to pay. Therefore, the 
awareness of the incentives to invest is valuable to the management of Södra.  
 
The study includes several issues, which must be investigated empirically. This comprises the 
member’s knowledge and beliefs of Södra’s lobbying activities, their appreciation of Södra as 
a lobbying tool and their understanding of the relationship between individual and collective 
action. It includes the support of lobbying activities performed by Södra and the incentives to 
accept the costs for those activities. 
1.5 Outline 
The outline of this study is presented in Figure 1. The chapters will be explained briefly in 
this section.  
 
Chapter 1 describes the problem background, problem, and problem analysis. This leads on to 
the aim of the study and its delimitations. Chapter 2 contains an introduction to the forestry 
branch in Sweden and present the organisation, function, and members of the cooperative 
Södra.  
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The theoretical framework is presented in Chapter 3, and it is based on a New Institutional 
Economics approach. The theoretical framework consists of the Theory of Collective Action 
and Property Rights Theory. At the end of the chapter, the theory is summarised into 
theoretical conclusions, to form a basis for the questionnaire. Chapter 4 describe the method 
for the collection of empirical data. This chapter also includes a discussion of the choice of 
method and a critical reflection of both method and result. Additionally, this chapter includes 
ethical discussion of the data collection.  
 
The result of the study is presented in Chapter 5. The chapter contains empirical data and 
analysis of the findings. The result leads on to chapter 6, where it is discussed in relation to 
the theoretical framework. In Chapter 7, the conclusions of the study are provided. 
Figure 1. Outline of the study. 
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2 The forestry industry and Södra 
In this chapter, the Swedish forestry industry is presented shortly to provide an understanding 
for actors that influence the development of the industry. This is followed by a description of 
the cooperative Södra. The purpose of the description is to facilitate the understanding of 
further analysis, the choice of theoretical framework and method.  
2.1 The forestry industry 
Traditionally, Swedish family forest owners are members of forestry cooperatives (LRF, 
2014). The purpose of the membership is to strengthen the forest owners’ position in the 
round wood market. Besides the benefits of jointly marketing and trading woods, the 
cooperative is also involved in political work and lobbying activities, though the cooperatives 
are politically independent. 
 
There are four forestry cooperatives in Sweden, namely Södra, Mellanskog, Norra, and 
Norrskog. (LRF, 2014). Together these cooperatives have 112.000 members, and whose 
combined acreage is 6.2 million hectares of forest. These four cooperatives operate in 
different regions of Sweden. The members of Södra are located in the south of Sweden, 
Mellanskog mainly in mid-Sweden while Norrskog and Norra are operating in the north and 
the far north, respectively. To obtain value and secure market access for their members, the 
cooperatives are involved in the industrial development, for example, the sawmilling industry. 
The political work is conducted together with other major actors within the forestry industry. 
Collaboration partners are for example the Federation of Swedish Family Forest Owners. The 
persistence of the collaboration is to promote forestry and be involved in the development of 
environmental legislation and policies. Besides, the collaboration includes responsibility to 
disseminate information and education.  
 
Except for forestry cooperatives, there are other actors involved in the forestry industry, for 
example, The Swedish Forest Industries Federation (www, Skogsindustrierna 1, 2018). This 
is an organisation for companies and associations that use forest as raw material for their 
products and services. The objectives of The Swedish Forest Industries Federation are to 
strengthen the competitiveness of their members and work for increased use of forest-based 
products. To accomplish this, The Swedish Forest Industries Federation is involved in 
dialogues with the government, agencies and political parties.  
 
The forestry sector also includes governmental agencies such as The Swedish Forest Agency 
and The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (www, Skogsstyrelsen 2, 2018; www, 
Naturvårdsverket 3, 2018). The assignment of The Swedish Forest Agency is to supervise that 
political decisions regarding forests are implemented and that the objectives are fulfilled 
(www, Skogsstyrelsen 2, 2018). The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency´s focus area 
is environmental issues within Sweden, EU and internationally (www, Naturvårdsverket 3, 
2018). 
2.2 Södra 
 
2.2.1 The group 
In 1938, the precursor of what would later be Södra was founded (www, Södra 3, 2018). In 
the 1960s and the 70s, Södra became a successful forestry group in the international market. 
However, because of the financial crisis in the late 70s, the Swedish government had to 
interfere and took over about 40 percent of the shares. These shares were in the mid-1980s 
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returned to Södra once the economy stabilised. Over the years, Södra has grown through 
mergers and therefore expanded geographically. The latest merger took place in 2007 when 
forest owners in the provinces of Bohuslän and Dalsland became members.  
 
Today, Södra is the largest forestry group in Sweden (Södra, 2017). In 2017, the net sales 
amounted to 20.5 billion SEK (Södra, 2018). Södra’s number of employees was 
approximately 3400 persons in 2017, and the number of members roughly 50.000 Swedish 
forest owners. 
 
The organisation of Södra is divided geographically into three regions called West, South, and 
East (www, Södra 4, 2018). These regions are divided into 36 Forestry Districts. The location 
of the member’s property determines which district the member belongs to. The forestry 
district is represented by a group of selected members, called representatives. The 
representatives are responsible for all activities within the district, monitoring the local 
political activity and execute the members’ interests. At the forestry districts’ annual 
meetings, 200 delegates are elected who participate at the cooperative society’s Annual 
General Meeting. During the Annual General Meeting, the board of directors is elected. The 
board consists of maximum ten member directors and three external directors. Thus, the 
majority of the board are forest owners. The board focuses on long-term objectives and 
strategic issues. The board also appoints the CEO, which is part of the Group Senior 
Management. Besides the CEO, the Group’s Senior Management includes business area 
presidents and executives who work with financial, market and human resource issues (www, 
Södra 5, 2018). 
 
2.2.2 The member 
In total, the members of Södra own about 2.5 million hectares of productive forest land 
(Södra, 2018). The members deliver nine million cubic meters of raw material to Södra’s 
industries. This is approximately a tenth of the total forest harvesting in Sweden. The amount 
of delivered raw material corresponds to 80 percent of Södra’s need for woods while the 
remaining 20 percent is bought on domestic and foreign markets. The members of Södra have 
mostly family-owned forest operations (Södra, 2017). The majority of the members are male, 
and female members account for about 35 percent. The average age of the members is 60 
years. About 60 percent of the members live permanently at their forest estate. The majority 
owns less than 100 hectares of productive forestland, and the income of forest corresponds to 
less than 10 percent of their total income.  
 
A member has different roles within the organisation; the member is the owner, supplier, 
lender, and costumer (www, Södra 4, 2018). Because of these roles, the member can be 
assured to have a market for the products. Södra is obligated to handle all wood that the 
member wishes to deliver, but the member is not obligated to deliver all woods to Södra 
(Pers. com., Tibblin, 2018). Besides processing forest products, Södra is assigned to provide 
advice and support to the members. 
 
Södra is a democratic organisation where each member has one vote regardless of the amount 
of delivered timber, the size of the member’s investment or how much forestland the member 
owns (www, Södra 4, 2018). The requirement that must be met to join Södra is either to own 
or to rent at least five hectares of productive forest, and it must be located within Södra’s area 
of operation, i.e., in the south of Sweden. There is no entrance fee, but each forest owner must 
contribute capital. In return for their investments, members receive dividends from the 
cooperative’s profit. The number of dividends is related to each member’s contribution capital 
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and the volume of woods delivered to Södra. The purpose of the model of Södra is to reward 
those members who actively and continuously trade with Södra. 
 
2.2.3 The operations 
The operations of Södra aim to promote the profitability of the members and secure a 
marketing channel for forest raw material (www, Södra 2, 2018). To achieve this, Södra 
trades, develops and processes the forest raw material, and later markets the processed 
products. Södra offers personal and professional help to all members regarding felling, 
thinning, planting and supply of new plants. The function is divided into three business areas; 
Södra Skog, Södra Woods and Södra Cell.  
 
Södra Skog. Södra Skog purchases woods from the members to be processed in saw mills and 
pulp mills (www, Södra 5, 2018). Besides the trading part, Södra Skog offers forestry services 
and complete solutions for those members who demand that type of service. The complete 
solution often involves the entire forest cycle, from plant to felling, including land preparation 
and replanting.  
 
Södra Wood. Södra Wood includes two types of products, sawn timber and interior wood 
products (www, Södra 5, 2018). In the sawmills of Södra, the wood is processed into 
construction material. The interior wood products are used for moulding, panelling, flooring, 
glue boards and posts. From wood raw material, Södra Wood also manufactures pellets and 
wood shavings.  
 
Södra Cell. This business operation includes three pulp mills (www, Södra 5, 2018). Södra 
Cell is one of the largest manufacturers of pulp in Europe. About 80 percent of the pulp in 
Södra Cell comes from softwood and the rest from hardwood. One pulp mill also processes 
pulp for fabric. By-products from the mills are used as biofuel, green electricity, and district 
heating. 
 
2.2.4 The financing 
The unique ownership structure in cooperatives obliges the cooperative to rely on member 
patrons to contribute equity capital (Peterson & Cobia, 2000). The individual equity capital is 
risk capital, whereby the equity holder has the rights to residual returns of the cooperative. 
 
As in practically all cooperatives, Södra’s equity consists of allocated capital, which is 
earmarked in the names of the members, and unallocated capital, which has resulted in that 
the cooperative has retained parts of the profits that it has made during the years (Peterson & 
Cobia, 2000; www, Södra 6, 2018). In Södra, there are two types of capital investments; 
direct investment and issued capital (www, Södra 6, 2018). When becoming a member, a 
direct investment requirement is calculated. This is a mandatory share determined by the size 
of the member’s productive forest land. Each member should pay 600 SEK per hectare forest, 
but no member has to contribute more than 120.000 SEK, which corresponds to an area of 
200 hectares. Above that ceiling, investments are voluntary. The share is treated as a debt that 
is deducted from the payment for the wood deliveries. The member can individually choose 
the rate of deduction by either two or four percent. The direct investment is returned to the 
member once the membership is finished. The issued capital is a foundation of dividends and 
belongs to each member, but it is retained by the cooperative for as long as the membership 
continuous. The issued capital goes to profit sharing.  
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Equity redemption is returned equity, in cash, to the members. The redemption can be done in 
several ways. Issued bonus shares is a consolidation of the surplus where the profit is divided 
amongst the members (www, Södra 6, 2018). This capital is not paid to the members. Instead, 
it is built up during the years of membership and dependent on the profit share.  
 
The members receive parts of Södra’s profit by capital retains, retained patronage refunds and 
dividends on shares (www, Södra 6, 2018). Members receive capital retains based on wood 
deliveries. Therefore, members who trade with Södra are rewarded. By retained patronage 
refunds, Södra transfers unallocated capital to the member’s account, based on how much 
capital each member holds. Dividends on shares are based on the capital that the members 
own in the cooperative, both direct investment and issued capital (www, Södra 6, 2018). The 
Annual General Meeting decides the part of the profit that will be divided amongst the 
members.  
 
A specific trait of Södra’s financial structure is that the allocated capital of all kinds is 
tradable and appreciable (www, Södra 6, 2018). It can be freely traded among members and 
employee at a specific market, whereby the market price is dependent upon the buyers’ and 
sellers’ expectation as to future returns on the shares. This financial structure means that the 
unallocated capital and the allocated capital are intertwined. The members know that the 
located capital can be converted into allocated capital. This is likely to affect their willingness 
to support the cooperative’s investments in collective action.  
 
2.2.5 The lobbying activity 
Representatives and employees of Södra actively work with lobbying in several levels; 
locally, regionally and internationally (www, Södra 2, 2018). The local level of lobbying is 
monitored by the local member operation. The regional and international level is monitored 
by the board of directors, the administrative council, and lobbying specialists. Currently, 
Södra has a team of three employees working full-time with lobbying and political issues. 
Additionally, Södra has several collaboration partners occupied with lobbying. Södra 
collaborates with The Swedish Forest Industries Federation and The Federation of Swedish 
Family Forest Owners (Södra, 2017). At the regional level, Södra manages the work 
unaccompanied or in collaboration with the regional Federation of Swedish Farmers’ 
organisation.  
 
The main issue of the lobbying is to ensure reasonable conditions for the forest owners (www, 
Södra 2, 2018). The development of profitability for the individual member is essential and 
improving the conditions for family forestry in Sweden. Another central issue for Södra is to 
promote the importance of forestry concerning the environment, the social economy and for 
Sweden. That implies to highlight the value of forest for everyone and to increase respect for 
forest owners and family forestry. As a part of this, Södra improves terms for small business 
that are oriented to forestry and trade of wood.  
 
The combined power of Södra's and the forest owners' opinion work has given results (www, 
Södra 2, 2018). There are examples of lobbying activities where the joint effort of the forest 
owners has played a decisive role. Lobbying activities that have been successful for Södra are 
as follows; the abolition of the fee for forest care, expropriation issues regarding roads and 
power lines, increased influence for landowners regarding management of wildlife and the 
advent of forest and environmental certification.  
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Current issues that Södra is involved in cover several areas (www, Södra 2, 2018; Pers. com., 
Tibblin, 2018). For example; the threat against the property rights of forest owners, 
production related issues, the trustworthiness of authorities, problems related to the right of 
public access such as eco-tourism, the balance between forestry and wildlife, the national 
forest program, the need for Sweden to establish its own sustainability objectives instead of 
adapting to the objectives of EU, clarify the conditions of the Species Protection Regulation 
and the legislation of key biotopes, survey of areas for outdoor life and involvement in current 
development of the legislation regarding forests. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework, based on the New Institutional Economic 
paradigm. The theoretical framework is used to examine the members’ incentives to accept 
the cooperative’s investments in lobbying. The main components of the framework are the 
Theory of Collective Action and Property Rights Theory. 
 
Södra is a cooperative and therefore, collectively governed. To understand how individuals 
interact in a collective context, the Theory of Collective Action is useful. In addition to the 
behaviour of individuals in a collective organisation, the theory explains the use of public 
goods such as forests and other natural resources. The theory includes social aspects such as 
individualism related to collectivism, as well as Game theory and Social Capital theory. 
Because cooperatives are collectively governed, the members have vaguely defined property 
rights, which might affect the member’s incentives to accept the cooperative’s lobbying costs. 
 
The chapter is summarised into theoretical conclusions or statements. These conclusions are 
used in the empirical investigation as a basis for the questionnaire. 
3.1 The Theory of Collective Action 
The collective action indicates individuals’ conscious collaboration (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 
1999). Marshall (1998) defines collective action as action taken by a group, directly or 
through an organisation, to fulfil the members’ perceived shared interest. Collective action 
can also be explained as a collaboration between individuals, to fulfil a collective purpose 
(Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999).  
 
The collective action implicates to collectively establishing a frame of rules and regulation for 
consumption of for instance natural resources, as well as monitoring, sanctioning and resolve 
disputes (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999). Collective action does not necessitate an 
organisation, although it facilitates and streamlining the work. The special thing about the 
consumption of natural resources is the involvement of several actors with varying interests. 
The users often act without communicating with others, which complicates collaboration 
(Adger, 2003). The collective action occurs when decisions are made through social 
interaction, information and functioning networks. The phenomenon of collective action can 
be connected to lobbying activities since cooperatives often act to defend members’ property 
rights (Staatz, 1987). By joining a cooperative, the members engage in collective action. 
Cooperatives usually take political action on particular issues where the members have a 
substantial economic interest. Through the cooperative, members get benefits from joint 
efforts. 
 
The development of collective action is challenging (Meinzen- Dick & Knox, 1999). There 
are high transaction costs, though these may be reduced to the extent that the actors involved 
in a collective action experience trust in each other. The leadership plays a significant role in 
getting these actors to engage and cooperate. Collective action is facilitated if based on 
volunteering rather than external interfering, forced incentives or sanctions (Ostrom, 1998).  
 
Different theoretical approaches may contribute to understanding collective action (Hardin, 
1982). Collective action is related to consumption of public goods and social issues, which 
includes psychological and behavioural aspects. Game theory and social capital theory are 
essential aspects of collective action, to understand the balance between individualism and 
collectivism in a group (Hardin, 1982; Adger, 2003). 
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Public Goods. Goods and services are usually traded at a market where the price is 
determined by supply and demand, assumed no market failure (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). 
What defines public goods is the lack of observable market price. Examples of traditional 
public goods are wilderness areas, national parks, and natural resources such as the forest. 
Public goods are explained by jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion (Hardin, 
1982). A good is jointly supplied if one individual’s consumption does not reduce the amount 
accessible. This definition is, however, not clear-cut; for example, air traditionally has been 
assumed to be joint of supply, but, nowadays the consumption of air leaves the air altered. 
The other definition state that if it is possible to prevent consumption of a certain good, that 
good is impossible of exclusion. 
 
The consumption of public goods is linked to social issues (Ostrom, 1998). Hardin (1968) 
stated the expression The Tragedy of the Commons to explain the complexity of public goods. 
When public goods are free, there is a risk of individuals overusing it, which follows the logic 
that if they do not use the public good, someone else will. Individuals, therefore, overuse the 
public good to maximise self-interests, and misalignment occurs between the individual and 
collective interests. Individuals face choices of maximisation of short-term self-interest yields 
outcome while leaving others worse off (Ostrom, 1998). In public-goods dilemmas, all those 
who would benefit from the consumption of public goods find it costly to contribute, and 
would rather prefer others to pay. Individuals oppose collective action due to the risk of 
contributing individual resources and exposing themselves to free rider behaviour (Staatz, 
1987). The forest is a natural resource and a public good. The right of public access allows 
everyone to consume benefits from the forest. The public access also allows other to interfere 
in the management of the forest. Due to many different actors, it is hard to arrange collective 
cooperation to jointly manage the forest to ensure long-term development. When individuals 
are free to benefit from the forest due to public access, there is a risk of overuse. 
 
The Balance of Individualism and Collectivism. Even though individuals are driven by 
self-interests that do not necessarily mean that groups of individuals must be driven only by 
common interests (Olson, 1965). If group members were to ignore their personal benefits, it is 
not likely that they collectively would seek group objectives. Self-interest seeking individuals 
tend to ignore collective interests, and instead of contributing, they become free riders (Kahn, 
2003; Olson, 1965). To prevent individuals from ignoring collective benefits, there must be 
some individual gain, based on the logic of self-interest behaviour (Ostrom 1998; Kirst-
Ashman & Hull, 2014). Individuals in a collective society will work to achieve collective 
objectives only if they expect a better individual outcome when the objectives are fulfilled. 
This assumption follows the logic that individuals are rational and self-interest seeking. This 
assumption is, however, debated.  
According to Hardin (1982), there is often a collective interest within a group of rational 
members. Therefore, the group must be rational and act rationally. Thus, if there is a rational 
group and the group would benefit from collective action, the group will automatically act 
rationally. However, these assumptions are opposed by theories within the collective action. 
The social dilemma stated within collective action is that when individuals seek personal 
interests, they fail to secure greater collective interests (Olson 1965; Hardin 1982). Such self-
interest rationality will either benefit collectively or prevent the success of collective 
accomplishments. This narrow rationality can be explained by game theory. 
Game theory. Game theory illustrates strategic aspects of individuals during social 
interaction (Hardin 1982). Two individuals interacting may either choose a strategy of 
cooperation or no cooperation. Assuming that the choices are made independently, and 
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without communication or bargaining, four outcomes are possible. If both individuals choose 
to cooperate, they will each receive a positive payoff. On the contrary, if they do not 
cooperate, they both face negative payoff. If one cooperates and the other does not, the 
cooperator faces even worse negative payoff, and the one that does not cooperate receives a 
very positive payoff. The fundamental idea is that the most positive outcome for both is to 
cooperate since the outcome of that choice is most evenly distributed. The foundation of the 
collective action, based on game theory, is that the individual must sacrifice a part of the 
individual positive gain, for the best of the collective. This reasoning does, however, have 
weaknesses or reasoning that may be questioned. Humans are not always capable of rational 
decisions (Ostrom, 1998). 
Bounded rationality. Individuals are boundedly rational and do not always calculate 
situations and outcomes from certain actions, which complicate collective action (Ostrom, 
1998). The individual is not capable of processing information to make a rational decision. 
Instead, individuals often use rules of thumb, heuristics, learned over time and previous 
outcomes in particular situations. In addition to learning variables, norms are important for 
collective action. Norms affect the way individuals act and learn in a social context. 
Therefore, norms vary among cultures, individuals, and situations. This can both facilitate and 
complicate social dilemmas. Certain norms affect the expectations of other members of a 
group. In that way, norms and reciprocity may create a reputation for keeping promises and 
performing actions with short-term cost and long-term benefits. If individuals believe that 
others intend to contribute, they will contribute since they have trust in these other individuals 
(Kahn, 2003). 
Social interaction. A reputation for being trustworthy can turn out a valuable asset (Feng et 
al., 2016). This asset is called social capital, which is an overall term for trust, satisfaction, 
and loyalty among the membership and between members and management. Further, social 
capital can be described as social networks or social ties between individuals within a group 
(Adger, 2003; Feng et al., 2016). The Social Capital Theory explains how individuals use 
their relationship to others in a group, both for personal good but also for collective good 
(Adger, 2003). Social capital is highly relevant for a collectively owned organisation since it 
reduces agency cost and facilitates the decision-making for the management (Feng et al., 
2016). Trustworthiness affects the incentive to corporate since individuals expect to be 
reciprocated (Ostrom, 1998). If trust increases, so do the social capital. Trust is essential to 
gain collective action (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999). If the group is characterised by trust, 
the members can engage in productive social exchange (Ostrom, 1998).  
Trust, reciprocity, reputation and the connection between these are essential to understanding 
how repeated face-to-face communication affects collective action (Ostrom, 1998). 
Cooperation is easier reached by face-to-face communication. Individuals, however, need 
skills to communicate and reach collective action to solve a social dilemma. Computerized 
communication is not as efficient as personal communication. Both social capital and face-to-
face communication may be a challenge if there is a large membership. If members are 
anonymous, there is less social capital and a higher risk of free rider behaviour (Feng et al., 
2016). A shortage of social capital, caused by wrongly used communication, have negative 
effects on collective action.  
 
The management and incentives of collective action are related to Property Rights Theory 
(Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999). The reason for addressing property rights when dealing with 
collective action is that property rights offer incentives for involvement. It can be assumed 
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that the holder of a property right will participate in activities to protect and ensure future 
benefits of investment. 
3.2 Property Rights Theory 
Property rights. Property rights can be explained as social institutions, which define or 
delimit the extent of granted privileges concerning a particular asset, e.g., a parcel of land or 
forest (Libecap, 1989). Cook and Iliopoulos (1999) describe property rights as socially and 
legally enforced rights for an individual to govern an economic asset. The property rights are 
connected to behavioural relations between economic actors regarding the use of valuable 
resources. The use includes defining access and use of natural resources, but also work 
relationships and ownership structure of an organisation (Libecap, 1989; Cook & Iliopoulos, 
1998; Libecap, 2003). All societies and environments require an organisation of property 
rights. The purpose is to control access and use of resources to avoid losses which may arise 
through open access, for example, public access regarding forest. Property rights prevent that 
the resource’s value is wasted due to competition for control. Besides, it contributes to 
avoiding the short-term use of assets when long-term probably would be more efficient. For 
example, the state, a group or private individuals can hold property rights.  
 
In economic analyses, ownership of an asset is often connected to the possession of the 
residual rights of control over that asset (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). A property holder has the 
right to make decisions that affect the value of an asset, besides what is regulated by the law. 
According to Christman (1994), the concept of ownership includes three components. The 
first component is the right to use the asset, the second regards the right to the returns, and the 
last component is the right to change or sell. Crucial is therefore that the owner can reallocate 
the resource, make decisions regarding the resource and even destroy the resource when it no 
longer has any value (Nilsson & Björklund, 2003). However, there are limitations in the 
effects that occur due to property rights. For example, it is costly to care for the resource and 
to monitor it so no one else can appropriate the resource (Nilsson, 2011). Regarding the 
ownership of forest, the residual right might be violated by external actors. For instance, the 
decision of felling can be disrupted by legislation or The Species Protection Regulation. 
 
Vaguely defined property rights. According to the theory, the property right holder is 
interested in caring for the asset (Nilsson, 2011). If property rights are well defined, the 
private and social benefits are equalised in economic choices, the benefits, and the costs are 
completely borne by the owner (Anderson & McChesney, 2003). Decisions regarding the 
resource aim to maximise total wealth, dependent on current income distribution and the 
composition of market demand. Otherwise, when the property rights are not well defined, or 
when it regards a group or the state, there are consequences for economic performance. Vague 
property rights affect the owner’s expectations of use of the asset. It can be assumed that the 
owner has no or little interest in cherishing the asset if the owner does not expect any return. 
Also, vaguely defined property right puts limitations in trade and reduce the value of the 
asset, i.e., affect the economical options for the owner. In society, this can lead to decreased 
economic performance, lower wealth and less economic opportunities for the owners.  
 
Property rights not only include ownership of land or forest. Hence, it also involves property 
rights of an organisation. In the case of collective ownership, in a cooperative, it results in 
suboptimal distribution and utilisation of resources (Nilsson & Björklund, 2003).  
Cook (1995) claims that problems in a cooperative occur due to vaguely defined property 
rights. These problems involve aspects explaining why members have a dislike to finance the 
cooperative or why the management makes investments that not all members are interested in, 
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which result in free rider behaviours among the members. It is also caused by the unique 
collective ownership structure in a cooperative. Some activities of the cooperative occur in the 
long term, perhaps beyond the time-period of membership for an individual member (Nilsson, 
2011). The collective ownership makes it more severe for the members to monitor the 
cooperative since ownership and control are separated in large cooperatives. The control is 
handed over to professional managers, which results in agency costs. Agency costs are 
founded on Agency Theory and consist of the relationship between a principal that hands over 
a task to an agent (Hakelius, 1999). The costs occur because the principal cannot always be 
sure that the agent performs the task as planned, due to information asymmetry and 
opportunistic behaviour. When using Agency Theory to analyse a cooperative, the member is 
often illustrated as a principal and the cooperative (management and board of directors) as the 
agent. To prevent the agent from acting opportunistic, members should constantly monitor the 
activities in a cooperative. However, the leadership of the cooperative may hold information 
that the members do not have and use this information as an advantage when making 
decisions on behalf of the members.  
 
Cook (1995) specifies five general problems rooted in the unique property right structure of a 
cooperative, which affect the efficiency of the organisation. These problems influence the 
members’ behaviour towards the collective organisation.  
 
The free rider problem can be divided into two types: external and internal problem (Cook & 
Iliopoulos, 1998). The external problem regards a common resource problem and depends on 
untradeable, insecure or unassigned property rights (Cook, 1995; Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). 
Individuals have incentives to gain benefits without contributing. This means that others 
completely carry the consequences (Nilsson, 2011). This results in members or non-members 
using a resource for their benefit (Cook, 1995). This mainly occurs in open membership 
cooperatives, for example when a non- member producer receives benefits from lobbying or 
negotiated terms of trade (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). The members who contribute cannot 
exclude others from receiving benefits, similar to the situation of public goods (Hardin, 1982). 
The internal free rider problem arises when new members receive equal patronage and 
residual rights as current members and are entitled to pay the same amount per unit of 
patronage (Cook, 1995). Intergenerational conflicts may accrue from equally distributed right 
and lack of a market for residual claims as reflecting. 
 
The horizon problem is a result of limited planning horizons of the members in a cooperative 
(Cook, 1995; Nilsson, 2011). This due to member’s residual claim on the net income caused 
by an asset having a shorter lifecycle than the productive life of the asset. In a cooperative, 
there is heterogeneity among the members regarding the expected time-period of the 
membership. The problem is that the collective objectives and investments might exceed the 
membership of an individual member. Therefore, members have incentives to make short-
term strategies (Nilsson, 2011). The horizon problem is caused by the non-transferability of 
residual claimant rights and the absence of a secondary market for such rights. This problem 
probably intensifies regarding investment in research and development, advertisement and 
other intangible assets that develop over a long time (Cook, 1995). The board of directors and 
management, therefore, are pressured to increase the proportion of the cooperatives cash flow 
devoted to currents payments to members, compared to investment and an acceleration in 
equity redemptions at the expense of retained incomes. 
 
The portfolio problem within a cooperative society refers to the difficulty of make 
investments adapted to the members’ heterogeneous risk preferences (Nilsson, 2011). When 
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there are no transferability, liquidity and appreciation mechanisms for exchanges of residual 
claims, the members are incapable of regulating their cooperative asset portfolio to match the 
risk preferences (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). Decisions of investments in a cooperative are 
allocated to patronage decision. Hence, members hold sub-optimal portfolios. Because of this, 
members are obtained to accept a higher degree of risk than preferably. Therefore, the 
pressure increase on decision makers to rearrange the investment portfolio, even though a 
reduced risk portfolio results in a decrease in expected returns.  
 
The control problem regards agency costs, which occur when attempting to prevent a conflict 
of interests amongst the members and the board of directors (principal) and management 
(agent) of the cooperative (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). The board operates on behalf of the 
members. Thus, the members have difficulties of monitoring the management (Nilsson, 
2011). Decisions of the management do not always correlate with the members' opinions. The 
management does not have to consider the member opinions. However, the management is 
dependent on the members as suppliers, and therefore they still have to consider the opinion 
of the membership. Due to devices in monitoring information and imperfect search, 
governance bodies operate with limitations (Cook, 1995). Within agricultural cooperatives, 
the provided information and external pressure exerted by publicly traded equity instruments 
are not existent. 
 
The influence cost problem refers to the indifference of the members, which create difficulties 
for the management to get acquainted with the wishes of the members (Nilsson, 2011). 
According to Cook and Iliopoulos (1998), influence activities occur when decisions within an 
organisation affect the distribution of wealth or other benefits amongst members, or groups of 
members in the organisation. In addition to individual interests, the affected members or the 
group of members tries to influence the decision to gain benefits. According to Cook (1995), 
the dimension of influence costs is determined by three factors; the existence of a central 
authority, the types of actions that govern decision making and the level of homogeneity or 
conflicts of interest among the members in the cooperative. Especially the level of 
homogeneity is a present challenge for agricultural cooperatives in Sweden (Hakelius, 1999). 
Hakelius (1999) discusses the change in agricultural cooperatives during the 20th century. 
Earlier, agricultural cooperatives were characterised by a homogeneous membership. 
Nowadays, the number of farmers in Sweden has been reduced, and at the same time, there is 
more specialisation in production orientation, which results in heterogeneity. 
 
The five problems stated above increase transaction costs within the cooperative organisation 
(Cook, 1995). Cooperatives might be affected differently. Cook and Iliopoulos (1998) 
demonstrate that the problems with vaguely defined property rights affect the member’s 
incentives to invest in the organisation. It influences the organisation’s ability to generate 
equity capital. The free rider, the horizon, and the portfolio problems tend to reduce members’ 
incentives to invest in the development of the cooperative. These problems include 
opportunistic behaviour by member-patrons and their evaluation of the set of cooperative 
property rights approved to address residual claim and residual rights of vital issues (Cook 
&Iliopoulos, 2000). Therefore, the members’ willingness to invest equity seem to increase 
when the cooperative is characterised by arrangements such as closed membership, marketing 
agreements, and appreciable equity shares. In addition to this, the latter type of cooperative 
consequently will have higher transaction costs. Better defined property rights, therefore, 
increase investment incentives. The control and influence cost problems affect the agency and 
coordination costs within the cooperative; consequently create inefficiencies that result in 
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disadvantages when cooperatives have to compete with firms that have more defined property 
rights structures (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). 
3.3 Theoretical conclusions 
This section presents conclusions based on the theoretical framework. These are linked to the 
aim of the study and therefore focused on the members’ incentive to accept that Södra uses 
collective funds to finance lobbying activities. The conclusions can be interpreted as a 
hypothesis for the empirical investigation.  
 
Theoretical conclusion 1: The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for 
lobbying increases if the investment complies with the individual interest.  
 
Individuals are expected to act by individual wealth-maximisation (Olson, 1965; Kahn 2003). 
If there is no individual gain, individuals are not willing to contribute to collective action 
(Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982). Thus, the members of Södra are likely to have weak interest in 
lobbying if they do not perceive any individual gains, whereas members want to support 
lobbying if they believe that this collective action may maintain the value of their forest.  
 
Theoretical conclusion 2: The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for 
lobbying increases by social interaction within the membership.  
 
Members of a group interact, and social capital evolves (Adger, 2003; Feng et al., 2016). 
Norms and reciprocity create a reputation for keeping promises and performing the collective 
action due to social capital within the group (Ostrom, 1998). Therefore, members influence 
each other. It might be assumed that Södra members interact and thus, they are kept informed 
about on-going happenings.  
 
Theoretical conclusion 3: The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for 
lobbying increases if they think that the management has good communication about the 
collective interests of the membership.  
 
Since trust, or social capital, is connected to communication, it facilitates collective action 
(Ostrom, 1998; Nilsson, 2011; Feng et al., 2016). It may be assumed that the members’ 
acceptance of lobbying is affected by the communication from the management, and how 
much insight the management provides for the members.  
 
Theoretical conclusion 4: The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for 
lobbying decrease if the lobbying benefits for non-member forest owners.  
 
The constraints of human behaviour restrict rational decisions (Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1998). 
According to the Tragedy of the Commons, individuals consume a good to prevent others 
from consuming it (Hardin, 1982). Also, members do not want to contribute to activities that 
benefit others (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). Södra’s lobbying can result in benefits to non-
members who do not financially contribute to the lobbying. Therefore, the members have 
weaker incentives to invest in lobbying if others profit.  
 
Theoretical conclusion 5: The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for 
lobbying decreases if the activity pays off beyond the membership horizon.  
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Members may object to a collectively owned cooperative’s investment if the returns may not 
be realised until after the members have exited (Cook, 1995; Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). If the 
profit comes in a far future, the member may perhaps not support the collective action (Olson, 
1965). The incentives to accept Södra’s lobbying activities might be affected by the time 
horizon for the outcome. The time horizon of a member can be limited by the length of the 
membership, and therefore the incentive to invest is affected.  
 
Theoretical conclusion 6: The members’ acceptance of Södra’s using collective funds for 
lobbying decreases if the outcome is uncertain.  
 
The members of a cooperative have different risk preferences (Nilsson, 2011). The members 
might want investments in lobbying with an uncertain outcome. Therefore, some members 
must accept more risk than preferred (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). Södra has a large and 
heterogeneous membership, which means different risk preferences. A risk-averse member 
perhaps not approve funds invested in risky lobbying activities. 
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4 Method  
The chapter first explains the methodological procedure. The chapter concerns a discussion of 
suitable research method, collection, coding and analysis of data, background variables and 
finally a discussion about quality and ethical considerations.  
4.1 Research approach 
The theoretical conclusions are to be empirically tested. There are different approaches to 
treating the relationship between theory and data. An inductive approach implies that theory is 
generated based on empirical observations (Bryman & Bell, 2015). A deductive approach is 
based on theory, from which hypotheses are formulated and empirically tested. This study has 
a deductive approach.  
 
Data can be quantitative or qualitative (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The choice of strategy depends 
on the aim of the study. A quantitative approach is usually related to a deductive view of the 
relation between theory and research, meaning that hypotheses are tested by observations of 
the reality. The quantitative approach often includes a collection of numerical data, mainly 
concerning numbers in the analysis (Denscombe, 1998). The data often represent a sample 
from a larger population in a resource-saving manner, using few variables for the analysis 
(Black, 1999; Denscombe, 1998). 
 
This study aims to find general conclusions about the membership of Södra. Therefore, a 
large number of empirical data is needed. Hence, a quantitative research approach is 
appropriate. A large number of observations increases the possibility to obtain a higher degree 
of generalizability, and the conclusions reflect trustworthiness (Denscombe, 1998, Robson, 
2011). Additionally, a quantitative approach is to be preferred when describing group 
tendencies and identify what commonly occurs within a group (Black, 1999).  
 
A qualitative approach would be preferable if the meaning were to gain a deeper 
understanding of a specific case (Robson, 2011). A qualitative approach for this study would 
comprise interviews with a limited number of members of Södra. When using a qualitative 
approach, the focus concerns words instead of numbers and how individuals perceive and 
interpret the social reality (Denscombe, 1998; Bryman & Bell, 2015). Qualitative approach 
implies a more constructive than objective view and the social society is in continuous 
change, affected by the individuals within it. To collect data with a qualitative approach 
requires more time and resources than accessible for this investigation, due to many 
respondents (Denscombe, 1998).  
4.2 Questionnaire 
There are several methods for collecting quantitative data (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Data can 
be collected either by structured interviews or by using a questionnaire.  
 
A structured interview implies that the researcher follows a predetermined interview guide 
and asks all participants the same questions in the same order (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The 
questions are standardised, which reduces the risk of differences between interviews. The 
interviews can be made either from face-to-face or by telephone. The researcher can adjust 
the questions during the interview to follow up a specific answer. However, a questionnaire is 
preferred when collecting a large amount of data (Denscombe, 1998; Robson, 2011).  
Questionnaires are suitable when the study intends to explore attitudes, opinions, comments, 
and beliefs (Denscombe, 1998). Therefore, it is suitable to use a survey, by a questionnaire, to 
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explore the members’ incentives to accept Södra using collective funds for lobbying 
activities.   
 
Nevertheless, a disadvantage of questionnaires is that the researcher is not present when the 
respondents answer the questions and therefore cannot ask additional questions or verify the 
respondent’s honesty (Denscombe, 1998). There may be a social desirability response bias; 
respondents do not always report their attitudes or beliefs truthfully to appear better (Robson, 
2011). Though, the researcher does not risk influencing the respondent's answer or asking the 
same question in different ways to the respondents when using a questionnaire (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015).  
 
In this study, the questionnaire is web-based, designed in the web-tool Netigate. A motive to 
use a web-based questionnaire is that the respondents are geographically spread, and the data 
is to be collected during a brief period (Robson, 2011). A web-survey requires that the 
respondents have access to the internet and an email address, which is the case for the vast 
majority of Södra’s members. Moreover, the researchers need to have access to the 
respondents’ email addresses. In this study, the e-mails were sent from Södra’s IT department, 
and so the researchers did not handle any e-mail addresses.  
 
The respondents received an e-mail containing a cover letter and an internet link to the 
questionnaire. This link could only be opened once by each unit, to make sure that no 
respondent answered more than once. Since the members of Södra are Swedish forest owners, 
the cover letter, and the questionnaire were written in Swedish. If the questionnaire was 
written in English, there might be members of Södra that resigned to participate due to 
linguistic reasons. 
 
4.2.1 Questionnaire design 
Cover letter 
A cover letter to the questionnaire provides information about what the questionnaire is used 
for and who sent it (Denscombe, 1998; Bryman & Bell, 2015). In addition, it mentions why 
the respondent has been selected and offer a guarantee of confidentiality. The e-mail sent to 
the members of Södra also contains a cover letter, written by the Officer of Member Relations 
at Södra (see Appendix 1 Cover letter). This cover letter provides information about the aim 
and objectives of the study. It also informs that the survey is a collaboration between Södra 
and students at the Swedish University of Agriculture Sciences.  
 
In addition, a cover letter written by the researchers was attached (see Appendix 2 Cover 
letter). Besides information about the aim of the study, it comprises assurance of anonymity, 
the estimated time to fill in the questionnaire and the voluntary participation. The letter 
contains a presentation of the lobbying activities of Södra. Also, it includes instructions for 
the respondents to make sure they understand the questions and the response options. Finally, 
the cover letter provides contact information to the researchers and the supervisor to allow the 
respondents to contact them if needed. 
 
Questionnaire  
The questions are based on the theoretical conclusions retrieved from the theoretical 
framework. A questionnaire can contain closed or open questions (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In 
this study, the questionnaire consists of closed questions, meaning that the respondent chooses 
among predetermined response options. This makes it easy to find relationships between 
variables and to compare the participants with each other, i.e., it facilitates the coding of data 
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(Bryman & Bell, 2015). However, there are disadvantages of closed questions. Perhaps, the 
respondents have difficulties in choosing an answer that relates to them. Another 
disadvantage occurs if the respondents do not find a suitable answer, which causes frustration 
whereas the respondents do not complete the survey. Also, information can be lost by using 
closed questions. In this study, the respondents were able to add a comment before finishing 
the questionnaire, to intercept valuable details not covered by the fixed alternatives. 
Open questions mean that the respondents answer each question in their own words without 
agreeing to a predetermined option (Bryman & Bell, 2015). But the coding of open questions 
requires much time and resources. Since there is a large number of members in Södra, 
eventual coding of open-ended questions would have taken too much time regarding the time 
frame of this study. It also sets a different demand on the respondent and requires more effort, 
which can decrease the response rate.  
According to a standardised questionnaire, both questions and the order of the questions was 
distributed in the same way for each participant, (Bryman & Bell, 2015). A standardised 
questionnaire is most suitable for surveys since it facilitates the coding and ensures that the 
questions are asked in the same way to each respondent (Robson, 2011). The respondent has 
to answer questions, either by choosing between predetermined responses options or a 
statement designed as a Likert scale. The Likert scale is an ordinal scale and suitable when the 
intention is a certain order or ranking of opinions solicited on a questionnaire (Black, 1999). 
The Likert scale in this study has five response options from totally disagree, agree to low 
extent, neutral, agree to high extent and totally agree. When using an ordinal scale, the 
intervals between the options are not assumed to be equal which must be taken into 
consideration when analysing the data (Black, 1999).  
Since the questionnaire is designed as a self-completing questionnaire, there are short 
instructions for each question or statement. It is vital to ensure that the respondents 
understand how they are expected to answer each question (Denscombe, 1998). That is 
especially important in this questionnaire since it includes both questions and statements with 
predetermined response options. The respondent was instructed at the beginning of the 
questionnaire and after the section of background questions. To further encourage the 
respondent to answer correctly, there was a short instruction above each response options.  
Questionnaires do not provide the possibility of follow-up questions (Denscombe, 1998). 
Therefore, it is essential that the questionnaire is carefully thought out. Before the 
questionnaire was sent out, it was tested by independent individuals to ensure that the 
questions or statement was precise, and not difficult to understand. To make sure that the 
empirical data would be able to analyse, a statistically experienced person was consulted 
before handed. The questionnaire was also sent to the Officer of Member Relations of Södra 
for feedback and approval. 
4.2.2 Choice of respondents 
There are difficulties with collecting data from an entire population due to time constraints 
and administrative reasons (Denscombe, 1998). Therefore, researchers often chose a sample, 
which is hopefully representative of the whole population. From the defined population, the 
sampling frame is selected (Robson, 2011). The sample frame constitutes a critical factor in 
the research process (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Therefore, it is important to choose a sampling 
frame that is representative of the population, to get a more generalizable result.   
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For this study, the population consists of the members in Södra. Considering that the 
questionnaire is sent by e-mail, the sampling frame constitutes all members of Södra that has 
a registered e-mail address and access to the internet. Because of a large membership, it is 
impossible to include the whole selection frame. Instead, the questionnaire is sent to a random 
sample within the selection frame. 
 
A random sample means that each unit of the sampling frame is equally probable of being 
selected (Bryman & Bell, 2015). To ensure a random selection of sample in the study, the 
selection was computerised with help from the IT-department at Södra. In that way, the risk 
of human bias is eliminated (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The selection is neither dependent on 
human contact, for example, how active the member is in the organisation.  
 
The size of the sample is often a compromise between factors such as time, cost, and size of 
the population (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In general, a larger sample increases precision and 
generalizability (Denscombe, 1998; Bryman & Bell, 2015). The larger the sample is, the more 
aspects could be covered. The sample size of this study is determined to 5000 members of 
Södra. 
 
4.2.3 Response rate and non-responses 
The response rate depends on the choice of method, the design of the survey, the 
characteristics of the respondents and what type of questions asked (Denscombe, 1998; 
Bryman & Bell, 2015). Hence, a well-considered survey can be vital for the response rate. A 
questionnaire consisting of a large number of questions or with several open-ended questions 
demands a lot of effort for the respondents. This might result in lower response rate (Bryman 
& Bell, 2015). The response rate can be improved by a well-formulated cover letter and clear 
instructions (Bryman & Bell, 2015). These aspects were considered when designing the 
questionnaire and cover letter. To ensure this, the questionnaire was tested by several 
individuals before it was sent to the members of Södra. Hence, it is possible to examine if the 
questions were perceived as the researchers intended. Also, the expenditure of time to 
complete the questionnaire was tested, which ensure that the questionnaire takes a reasonable 
time to respond. 
 
Two main strategies can be used to increase response rate. First, the questionnaire was sent by 
e-mail and not postal. Postal surveys tend to require more efforts by the respondents since 
they must answer the questionnaire, and send it back to the researchers (Bryman & Bell, 
2015). In this study, the respondents answer the questionnaire online, which means that the 
result is registered directly without the respondent having to send it back actively. The second 
strategy is to send a reminding e-mail to non-respondents, which may raise the response rate 
significantly (Bryman & Bell, 2015). However, in this study, it is not possible to send a 
reminder e-mail to non-respondents. This due to the IT system of Södra is not compatible 
with the university’s web-tool Netigate, and therefore it is not possible to identify members 
who already have responded. 
 
The questionnaire was sent to the sample of 5.000 members by e-mail on the 12th of April 
2018, and it was closed the 21th of April. When the survey was closed, the number of 
respondents was 782, which finished the whole questionnaire, and this implies a response rate 
of 15.6 percent. Thus, there is a possibility that the e-mail list to the members contains 
outdated addresses. This makes it difficult to estimate the number that truly received the 
questionnaire. In addition, the response rate varies through the questionnaire since the 
respondents could choose to finish the questionnaire without answering all questions. The 
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ones who filled-in parts of the questionnaire are 845. This means that the response rate 
fluctuates between 15.6 and 16.9 percent. 
4.3 Processing and analysis of data 
After closing the questionnaire, the raw material of data was exported from the web-tool 
Netigate to Excel and the software package SPSS statistics for further analysis. The Likert 
scale was coded by the ranking, namely 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The variables 
not continuous, nominal variables was coded from 1 for yes to 3 for other.  
 
By using descriptive analysis of the collected data, data can be summarised, described and 
patterns in the data identified. Descriptive statistics emphasis on graphical and numerical 
procedures, suitable for a categorical variable such as nominal and ordinal data. The 
descriptive analysis involves measurement of frequencies and is appropriately presented as 
graphs (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This descriptive analysis is used for evaluating the theoretical 
conclusions of this study.  
 
The empirical data include background variables, which enable to evaluate if there are 
statistically significant differences or similarities between groups of members. Such analysis 
may state, for example, if members living permanently at their forest estate answer differently 
at the questions compared to members not living on their estate.  
 
4.3.1 Statistical analysis method 
In this study, the statistical analysis method is the chi-square test. A chi-square test is a test of 
statistical significance. Hence, it allows estimation of how confident the result of the 
randomly selected sample is, i.e., if the sample selected is generalizable for the whole 
population (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The test assumes a null hypothesis, which specifies that 
the medians of the population distributions are identical (Newbold et al., 2003). It means that 
the two-tailed hypotheses are as follows. 
 
H0: The medians of the populations are equal  
 
H1: The medians of the population are not equal  
 
When the null hypothesis is set up, the level of statistical significance is established (Bryman 
& Bell, 2015). For this study, a significance level of 95 percent was determined.  
 
The test results in either rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis by evaluate the p-value 
(Newbold et al., 2003). If the null hypothesis is accepted, there is no difference between 
groups. If the p-value is less than 0.05 (5 percent) the test is statistical significant, and the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is a significant difference between the groups. If the p-
value exceeds 0.05 the test is not statistical significant, hence the null hypothesis is accepted, 
and there is no significant difference between the groups.  
 
4.3.2 Chi-square test 
The chi-square test is one of the most common and flexible statistical test, used to identify 
relations between variables (Robson, 2011). The chi-square test measure differences between 
observation and expected frequencies in a cross table (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Further, this 
analysis allows examining if there is statistical significance when comparing groups of 
respondents, between an independent and dependent variable. It allows establishing at what 
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level the result is statistical significant. When using a chi-square test, it is assumed that the 
units are equally distributed in the correlation table. The test means nothing alone, but can be 
useful in relation to a predetermined level of statistical significance. Additional, the chi-
square test include the degree of freedom, referring to the number of options for each 
participant.  
 
In the following chapter, the results from the chi-square test will be presented by following 
formula; X2(df, N)=p. X2 represents the chi-square test, df means Degree of Freedom, N is the 
number of respondents and p is the p-value. The p-value is compared to the predetermined 
level of significance. 
 
The chi-square test is limited by two requirements (Denscombe, 1998). The first requirement 
is that maximum 20 percent of the expected frequencies can be less than five. The second 
requirement is that the expected value must exceed one. If these requirements are not fulfilled, 
the accuracy of the statistics can be affected. To avoid this problem, it is possible to perform a 
logical merger, where two or more groups are combined.  
4.4 Background variables 
At the beginning of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked about some background 
information. These questions were not based on theoretical conclusions, and therefore not a 
part of the result. Instead, it contributed a basis for the statistical analysis. Södra has a large 
and heterogeneous membership, and thereby it might be expected that different member 
categories have different attitudes. Hence, it was possible to identify if there are differences 
among the categories. All background questions can be found in Appendix 3 Questionnaire. 
 
The questionnaire consisted of the following background variables; gender, age, acreages, 
type of production, years as a member of Södra, if the member lives permanently on the forest 
estate and if the member has a successor or not. Variables of this type are called nominal 
(Black, 1999). These variables are not ranked, and the conclusions are binary, the respondent 
either belongs to the category or not.  
 
The members’ age was ranked on a scale from under 30 years to older than 80 years (see 
Figure 2). Most respondents stated that they are 61- 70 years (33 percent), followed by the age 
51-60 years (25 percent), 71-80 years (18 percent), 41-50 years (15 percent), 31-40 years (6 
percent), over 80 years (2 percent) and under 30 years (1 percent). Regarding gender, male 
amounted to 79 percent, female 21 percent and non-binary represented less than 1 percent.  
 
The third background variable included information about the number of hectares of forest 
each member owns. Most members own 31-70 hectares (32 percent), followed by 101-500 
hectares (26 percent), 6-30 hectares (21 percent), 71-100 hectares (17 percent), up to 5 
hectares (2 percent), 501-1000 hectares (1 percent) and over 1000 hectares (1 percent). 
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Figure 2. Results from questions “age” and “permanently living at your forest estate”. 
The members were asked about their main production orientation. On the question, most 
members indicated forestry (81 percent), followed by animal production (7 percent), grain 
production (4 percent). The remaining indicated other production (9 percent). Regarding 
permanent living on the estate, most members live on their estate (56 percent), followed by 
not living on their estate (43 percent) (see Figure 2). 
 
The sixth question concerns if there is a successor or not (see Figure 3). Most members 
answered yes (67 percent), followed by other option (18 percent), and no (16 percent). When 
the members were asked for how long they have been a member, most members indicated 11-
20 years (24 percent), followed by 21-30 years (22 percent), 0-5 years (17 percent), 31-40 
years (16 percent), 41-50 years (7 percent) and over 50 years (1 percent) (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Results from questions “years of membership” and “successor or not”. 
The members were asked what geographic area of Södra they operate in. Every area was 
represented, though, the majority indicated Skåne (6 percent), followed by Finnveden (6 
percent), Ljungby (5 percent) and Vimmerby (4 percent).  
 
To gain an insight into the awareness of lobbying among the members, the eighth and last 
background question covered this. Most members indicated yes (76 percent), followed by no 
(18 percent) and the remaining indicated other (7 percent).  
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Four background variables are used to examine if there are differences in the answers among 
the member categories. These background variables are; “age”, “permanently living on the 
estate”, “years of membership” and “successor or not”. It is assumed that these variables can 
be expected to constitute differences in the responses. Due to the requirements for a chi-
square test, member categories based on the variables “age”, “permanently living on the 
estate”, and “years of membership” are merged to larger groups.  
 
Besides providing basic information about the respondents, the background variables can be 
an indicator if the sample is representative of the population. Thus, the background variables 
are not the only measurement for representativeness, but when the result is compared to 
Södra’s information about the average member, they can indicate if the sample is more 
representative. The average member in Södra is around 60 years old, more than half of the 
membership lives permanently at their forest estate and owns less than 100 hectares of forest 
(Södra, 2017). This corresponds to the empirical data, which therefore indicate that the 
sample is representative. Additionally, the background information also shows that the 
respondents are geographical spread throughout Södra’s area of operation. 
4.5 Quality assurance and ethical considerations 
In business research, there are criteria for evaluating the quality of the research (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). The quality of quantitative researches is associated with reliability and validity 
(Golafshani, 2003).  
 
Reliability refers to the consistency of measurement (Robson, 2011). It can also be explained 
as the stability of measurement, i.e., whether a measure is stable over time (Bryman & Bell, 
2015). The reliability of the study increases if the result of a repeated investigation, at another 
time not fluctuate, i.e., similarities in the result indicates that the measure is stable 
(Golafshani, 2003. Replication concern the possibility for others to replicate the study 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). To achieve reliability and replicability, the research approach and 
choice of respondents is carefully described. This also applies to the method of collection, the 
coding and the analysis of the data. 
 
Validity concern whether the means of measurement are accurate and if the data measure as 
intended (Drost, 2012; Golafshani, 2003). There are different types of validity (Drost, 2012). 
Internal validity concerns the causality of the study, hence, if the causal relationship between 
two variables is stable and not affected by another variable (Bryman & Bell, 2015). To ensure 
validity, it is essential that the questions asked in the study are measuring what the researcher 
aims to measure. When using a self-completion questionnaire, it is always desirable to 
conduct a pilot study. A pilot study might reduce validity issues. Thus, it is a way to evaluate 
the design of the questionnaire. In this study, no pilot study was made due to limitations in 
time. Hence, before the members of Södra received the questionnaire, it was tested on 
selected individuals, including the Officer of Member Relations of Södra. By testing the 
questionnaire, it was possible to evaluate if the questions were understandable and if the 
structure was satisfying. The test also made it possible to make improvements and 
clarifications of the questionnaire.  
 
Generalizability refers to external validity and is a concept for establishing trustworthiness of 
the study (Robson, 2011). Generalizability concerns to what degree the result of the study are 
applicable, i.e., if the result would be the same in other contexts or among persons other than 
those who are involved. This implies that quantitative research must have a representative 
sample (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Nevertheless, a representative sample is taken into 
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consideration in the study; it is not appropriate to generalise the findings outside the selected 
sample. Thus, the result of the study can be relevant for comparable populations.  
 
In social research, it is necessary to consider ethical aspects (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Bryman 
and Bell (2015) present four main areas of ethical principles; if participation in the study 
bring harm to the respondent, if there is a lack of informed consent, if the study implies 
invasion in the participant’s privacy and if the study involves deception. Information provided 
by respondents must be handled strictly professional to defend the respondent’s integrity 
(Denscombe, 1998). The cover letter, therefore, provides the respondent with information 
about the aim of the study and explain that the respondent’s personal information is handled 
correctly. To ensure that the study does not cause any harm to the respondents, all 
respondents are anonymous, and the data material is handled confidentially. The web-tool 
Netigate converts the answers to numbers, and therefore it is not possible to identify any 
individual or connect any answer to a certain respondent. Further, the data material was only 
handled by the researchers and no one else had access to the material. For using Netigate, it 
requires an account, which means that a password protects the data. This ensures that the data 
material only is used for the intended study.  
 
In the cover letter, the respondents can find the information that participation in the study is 
voluntary. To facilitate the decision on participation or not, clear and sufficient information 
about the study must be obtained (Denscombe, 1998). Therefore, it is important that the 
respondents also are sufficiently informed about what the study is about. Further, the 
respondent can find contact information to the researchers, if there would be any questions.  
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5 Results and analysis 
This chapter presents result and analysis of the study. Each section starts with a theoretical 
conclusion, followed by questions linked to the specific conclusion. To facilitate the 
descriptive analysis of the questions, all percentages are rounded to nearest integer. To 
examine differences between member categories with regard to background variables, each 
question is analysed by two background variables. The background variables used are “age”, 
“permanently living on the estate”, “years of membership”, and “successor or not”. For a full 
presentation of the result, see Appendix 3 Questionnaire.  
 
Comments from the last open-ended question in the questionnaire are used to further illustrate 
the members’ attitude to lobbying. However, the possibility to comment was given last in the 
questionnaire, not in connection with a certain question. The comments are used to illustrate 
or underline some of the results. The citations are translated from Swedish to English.  
5.1 Individual interest  
The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for lobbying increases if the 
investment complies with the individual interest. 
 
The theoretical conclusion was tested by the questions “Södra should engage in business 
policy activities”, “Södra does a better business policy work than individual forest owners can 
do”, “How important are the different business policy issues to you”, “Södra’s efforts in 
business policy provide benefits to me through, for example, increased value of my forest 
property”, “For Södra to invest in business policy, the questions must be important to me, 
e.g., such as increases the value of my forest”, and “It is good that Södra invests in business 
policy because Södra engages in the issues that are important to me”.  
 
To make members of a collective organisation engaged in collective action, it is crucial that 
the members can identify individual gains among the collective objectives, based on the logic 
of self-interest seeking. Södra engages in lobbying activities to improve the members’ 
conditions to conduct forestry. This collective action demands lots of effort and resources. 
Therefore, it is crucial to examine if the members support this investment or not. On the 
question “Södra should engage in business policy activities”, most members indicated that 
they totally agree (42 percent) or agree to high extent (35 percent). This was followed by 
neutral (13 percent), agree to low extent (8 percent) and totally disagree (2 percent) (see 
Figure A12, Appendix 3). The following citations further illustrate the attitude to Södra’ 
lobbying investment:  
 
“Influence is invaluable” 
“The importance of business policy has become clearer” 
 
A chi-square test was performed to analyse the relationship between member categories based 
on the background variables, but neither test showed statistical significance. This means that 
the members are equally likely to respond, regardless of the member categories.  
 
Södra is a collective organisation, and collective action may strengthen influence in business 
policy issues compared to individual effort. Hence, one question captures if the members 
think that Södra does a better business policy work compared to individual engagement (see 
Figure A13, Appendix 3). Most members indicated totally agree (45 percent), followed by 
agree to high extent (35 percent), neutral (14 percent), agree to some extent (4 percent) and 
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totally disagree (1 percent). A chi-square test, based on the background variable “years of 
membership” indicated statistical significance, X2 (8, N=807) =15.69. P= 0.047, p< 0.05 (see 
Figure 4). There is a significant difference between the members concerning how long they 
have been members of Södra. The question was analysed by the other background variables, 
which indicated no statistical significance. 
 
 
Figure 4. Result from the question “Södra does a better business policy work than individual owners can do”, 
analysed by background variable “years of membership”. 
Södra engages in various lobbying activities. The members were therefore asked how 
important they experience the following business policy issues; Preserving the property right, 
the species protection regulation and legislation of key biotopes, the balance between forestry 
and wildlife, the trustworthiness of authorities, problems related to the right of public access 
and production related issues. If the issues are individually important, it can be assumed that 
the members are more positive about the lobbying activity. It is related to the assumption of 
individual gain within a collective organisation. Based on the result and the response options, 
the majority of the members considers that the issues presented are quite important or very 
important (see Figure A14a-14f, Appendix 3). The following citations further illustrate that 
Södra promotes the members interests:  
 
“It is crucial to engage future forest owners in unrestricted user rights” 
“It feels like the right to public access has overruled the property right. The authorities 
decide over my private economy, the forest” 
 
Individual benefits probably result in a more positive attitude for lobbying, such as increased 
value of the estate. The question “Södra efforts in business policy provide benefits to me 
though, for example, increased value of my forest property” resulted in most members 
indicated agree to high extent (40 percent), followed by neutral (32 percent), totally agree (20 
percent), agree to a limited extent (6 percent) and totally disagree (2 percent) (see Figure A15, 
Appendix 3). A chi-square test was performed to analyse the response option by background 
variable “permanently living on the estate”, which indicated statistical significance X2 (4, 
N=790) =9.97. P=0.042, p<0.05 (see Figure 5). Hence, there is a difference of opinion 
amongst the members depending on whether they live on the estate or not. This question was 
further analysed. The analyse by background variable “successor or not” resulted in X2 (8, 
N=791) =19.28. P= 0.013, p<0.05. The analyse by background variable “years of 
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membership” also showed statistical significance, X2(8, N=794) = 15.58. P= 0.049, p<0.05, 
indicating that the members disagree depending on the years of membership. 
 
 
Figure 5. Results from the question “Södra’s efforts in business policy provide benefits to me through, for 
example, an increased value of my forest property”, analysed by background variable “permanently 
living on the estate”. 
The question “for Södra to invest in business policy the issues must be important to me, e.g., 
such as increases the value of my forest” showed that most members agree to high extent (48 
percent), followed by totally agree (22 percent), neutral (19 percent), agree to low extent (9 
percent), and totally disagree (3 percent) (see Figure A16, Appendix 3). The chi-square test 
by background variable “age” indicated statistical significance X2 (8, N=789) =27.90. 
P=0.000, p<0.05 (see Figure 6). This means that the members’ age is related to their response 
option regarding this question. However, the other tests showed no statistical significance.  
 
 
Figure 6. Result from the question “for Södra to invest in business policy, the questions must be important to me 
e.g., such as increases the value of my forest”, analysed by background variable “age”. 
The last question “It is good that Södra invests in business policy because Södra engages in 
the issues that are important to me” is related to the balance between collective and individual 
objectives, to examine if the members experience that Södra engages in accurate issues. The 
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result is that most members agree to high extent (46 percent), followed by totally agree (30 
percent), neutral (16 percent) agree to low extent (6 percent) and totally disagree (2 percent) 
(see Figure A17, Appendix 3). 
 
The chi-square test indicated statistical significance when analysed by background variable 
“age” X2 (8, N=791) = 45.84. P= 0.000, p<0.05. When analysed by background variable 
“years of membership”, the chi-square test showed statistical significance X2 (8, N=793) 
=30.86. P= 0.000, p<0.05 (see Figure 7). Hence, the attitude in this question differs, 
depending on age and years of membership. 
 
 
Figure 7. Results from the question “It is good that Södra invests in business policy because Södra engages in 
issues that are important to me”, analysed by background variable “years of membership”. 
5.2 Social interaction 
The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for lobbying increases by social 
interaction within the membership. 
 
The theoretical conclusion was tested by the questions “I trust that Södra manages my 
interests regarding business policy”, “How do you experience the discussion climate in 
Södra”, and “My trust in Södra and my relationship with the members make me more positive 
about Södra’s focus on business policy issues”. 
 
Social capital is essential to collective organisations and collective action. Trust in 
management and other members might affect members’ attitude for lobbying activities. 
Reciprocity and norms affect how the members act within the organisation. However, within 
a large organisation, there are two types of social capital. First, social capital can evolve 
between management and members. The other type includes social capital between the 
members. On the question “I trust that Södra manages my interests regarding business policy” 
most members indicated agree to high extent (46 percent), followed by totally agree (32 
percent), neutral (15 percent), agree at a low grade (4 percent) and totally disagree (3 percent) 
(see Figure A18, Appendix 3). The following citations further illustrate the attitude to Södra’ 
lobbying investment:  
 
“To listen to the members is important” 
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Statistical significance was founded when analysed by background variable “Age”, X2 (8, 
N=789) = 33.08. P= 0.000, p<0.05. The analyse by background variable “Successor or not” 
indicated statistical significance X2 (8, N=787) =16.96. P=0.031, p<0.05. This question was 
also analysed by a chi-square test based on background variable “years of membership”, 
which indicated statistical significance X2 (8, N=790) = 26.51. P= 0.001, p<0.05 (see Figure 
8). That means that the trust in Södra differs among the member categories when analysed by 
all background variables, except permanently living on the estate.  
 
 
Figure 8. Results from the question “I trust that Södra manages my interests regarding business policy”, 
analysed by background variable “years of membership”. 
The question “How do you experience the discussion climate in Södra” includes three sub-
questions to provide an understanding of the discussion climate in Södra. The sub-questions 
include relations between different members, between members and management and 
between members and non-member forest owners (see Figure A19a-19c, Appendix 3). Most 
members indicated that they consider the discussion climate quite good or neutral in the three 
different sub-questions.  
 
The question “My trust in Södra and my relationship with the members make me more 
positive about Södra investing in business policy” was used to identify if the members are 
affected by the social interaction in Södra. Most members indicated agree to high extent (44 
percent), followed by neutral (26 percent), totally agree (21 percent), agree to low extent (6 
percent) and totally disagree (3 percent) (Figure A20, Appendix 3). However, the chi-square 
test analysed based on background variable “Age” indicated statistical significance X2 (8, 
N=777) = 44.26. P =0.000, p<0.05. When analysed by background variable “successor or 
not” the test also resulted in statistical significance X2 (8, N=776) = 22.95. P= 0.003, p<0.05.  
 
In addition, the analyse by background variable “years of membership” resulted in statistical 
significance X2 (8, N=779) = 21.70. P= 0.006, p<0.05. (see Figure 9). Thereby, concerning 
the age of the members, successor or not and years of membership, there is a difference 
between the member categories.  
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Figure 9. Results from the question “My trust in Södra and my relationship with the members make me more 
positive about Södra´s focus on business policy”, analysed by background variable “years of 
membership”. 
5.3 Communication 
The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for lobbying increases if they think 
that the management has good communication about the collective interests of the 
membership. 
 
The theoretical conclusion was tested by the questions “How do you prefer to get information 
about which business policy issues that Södra is working with”, “If Södra informed better 
about business policy, I would be more positive”, and “The information about Södra’s 
objectives with business policy is sufficient”. 
 
To engage individuals in collective action, communication is of the essence. The question 
“How do you prefer to get information about which business policy issues that Södra is 
working with” was used to indicate the members’ attitude towards different communication 
channels. Most members prefer information from Södra by e-mail (57 percent) or by 
Södrakontakt (55 percent) (see Figure A21, Appendix 3). The least appreciated 
communication channel is social media (10 percent), by phone (2 percent) and other (2 
percent). 
 
The members were asked if a better communication would positively affect their attitude for 
business policy issues. Most members indicated that they are neutral (45 percent), followed 
by agree to high extent (31 percent), agree to low extent (10 percent), totally agree (8 percent) 
and totally disagree (6 percent) (see Figure A22, Appendix 3). The chi-square test did not 
show statistical significance for any background variable, which means that the attitude 
regarding the effect of better communication from Södra is not related to the member 
categories. 
 
Regarding the final question “The information about Södra’s objectives with business policy 
is sufficient”, the majority indicated neutral (35 percent), followed by agree to high extent (34 
percent), agree to low extent (17 percent) while totally agree and totally disagree got 7 percent 
each (see Figure A23, Appendix 3). The chi-square test was performed by background 
variable “age”, which indicated statistical significance X2 (8, N=775) =26.33. P= 0.001, 
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p<0.05 (see Figure 10). Therefore, the outcome of this question is dependent on the members’ 
age. Further chi-square tests indicated no statistical significance. 
 
 
Figure 10. Results from the question “The information about Södra´s objectives with business policy is 
sufficient”, analysed by background variable “age”.  
5.4 Non-member benefits  
The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for lobbying decrease if the 
lobbying benefits for non-member forest owners. 
 
The theoretical conclusion was tested by the questions “Södra should invest in business policy 
although it may benefit other forest owners who do not contribute to the investments”, and “If 
the results of business policy only benefit Södra’s members, I would be more positive about 
the efforts”. 
 
When Södra engages in lobbying activities, it might benefit all Swedish forest owners and not 
just the members of Södra. However, the costs of lobbying are borne only by the members. 
On question “Södra should invest in business policy although it may benefit other forest 
owners who do not contribute to the investment” most members indicated that they agree to 
high extent (45 percent), followed by totally agree (23 percent), neutral (21 percent), agree to 
low extent (8 percent) and totally disagree (3 percent) (see Figure A24, Appendix 3). A chi-
square test was performed based on the background variables. Since the tests showed no 
statistical significance by either background variable, there is no difference between the 
member categories.  
 
On the question “If the results of business policy only benefit Södra’s members I would be 
more positive”, the majority indicated neutral (32 percent), followed by totally disagree (29 
percent), agree to high extent (18 percent), agree to low extent (13 percent) and totally agree 
(8 percent) (see Figure A25, Appendix 3). A chi-square test indicated no statistical 
significance. The following citations further illustrate the members’ attitude to Södra’s 
lobbying investment:  
 
“Business policy is important to all forest owners, members- non-members- members of 
another organisation” 
“Södra is good for all forest owners but best for their members” 
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“Business policy cannot be related to individual forest owners. The engagement provides 
benefits for everyone” 
5.5 Membership horizon 
The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for lobbying decreases if the 
activity pays off beyond the membership horizon. 
 
The theoretical conclusion was tested by the questions “In particular, Södra should focus on 
such business policy issues that deliver results in the near future” and “Södra should invest in 
business policy even if the result is achieved after my membership has ceased”.  
 
The member’s engagement in Södra’s lobbying activities is assumed to be related to the 
remaining years of membership. On question “In particular, Södra should focus on such 
business policy issues that deliver results in the near future” the majority indicated neutral (30 
percent), followed by agree to high extent (24 percent), agree to low extent (22 percent), 
totally disagree (18 percent) and totally agree (6 percent) (see Figure A26, Appendix 3). A 
chi-square test was performed based on background variable “age”, which showed statistical 
significance X2 (8, N=771) = 21.70. P= 0.006, p<0.05 (see Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11. Result from the question “In particular, Södra should focus on such business policy issues that 
deliver results in the near future” analysed by background variable “age”. 
Regarding lobbying activities, there is a risk that members invest in activities that give a 
positive outcome too far off in the future, which means that members have contributed 
without taking part of the benefits. To examine the influence of remaining membership period 
the question “Södra should invest in business policy even if the result is achieved after my 
membership has ceased” was asked. Most members indicated agree to high extent (40 
percent), followed by totally agree (36 percent), neutral (17 percent), agree to low extent (6 
percent) and totally disagree (2 percent) (see Figure A27, Appendix 3). When the question 
was analysed by the chi-square test, neither background variable indicated statistical 
significance. 
5.6 Uncertainty 
The members’ acceptance of Södra using collective funds for lobbying decreases if the 
outcome is uncertain. 
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The theoretical conclusion was tested by the questions “It is difficult to determine which 
business policy issues that affect my forestry” and “Södra should work with business policy, 
although it is difficult to know how the outcome will be”.  
 
As a forest owner, it can be difficult to determine which lobbying activities that affect 
forestry. If the members are aware that Södra’s lobbying activities influence their forestry, it 
might affect the acceptance of these activities. Therefore the members were asked the 
question “It is difficult to determine which business policy issues that affect my forestry,” 
most members indicated agree to high extent (34 percent), followed by neutral (27 percent), 
agree to low extent (20 percent), totally agree (12 percent) and totally disagree (7 percent) 
(see Figure A28, Appendix 3). Neither of the chi-square tests showed statistical significance. 
 
When Södra engages in lobbying activities, it is an investment without known outcome. 
Therefore, it is possible to assume that the members rather prefer Södra to avoid lobbying 
activities and instead use the resources for more safe investments. Hence, the members were 
asked “Södra should work with business policy although it is difficult to know how the 
outcome will be” most members indicated agree to high extent (46 percent), followed by 
totally agree (26 percent), neutral (17 percent), agree to low extent (8 percent) and totally 
disagree (3 percent) (see Figure A29, Appendix 3). A chi-square test was performed based on 
background variable “age”, the test showed statistical significance X2 (8, N= 769) = 16.57. P= 
0.035, p<0.05 (see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12. Result from the question “Södra should work with business policy although it is difficult to know how 
the outcome will be” analysed by background variable “age”. 
5.7 Summary 
To facilitate the identification of statistical significances between the member categories, the 
results from all chi-square tests are presented in Table 1. The questions are found in Appendix 
3. For every question analysed by a background variable, the p-value is presented. As can be 
observed in the table, the statistical significance fluctuates. Some questions indicate no 
difference between the member categories, while others show a significant difference by 
several background variables.  
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Table 1. Summary results and analysis 
Question/ 
variable 
“Age” “Permanently 
living” 
“Successor or 
not” 
“Years of 
membership” 
Q12 (Figure A12) Not significant 
P=0.195 
Not significant 
P=0.195  
Not significant 
P=0.242 
Not significant 
p=0.164 
Q13 (Figure A13) Not significant 
P=0.592 
Not significant 
P=0.213 
Not significant 
P=0.787 
Significant 
P=0.047 
Q15 (Figure A15) Not significant 
P=0.130 
Significant 
P=0.042 
Significant 
P=0.013 
Significant 
P=0.049 
Q16 (Figure A16) Significant 
P=0.000 
Not significant  
P=0.543 
Not significant 
P=0.173 
Not significant 
P=0.201 
Q17 (Figure A17) Significant 
P=0.000 
Not significant 
P=0.237 
Not significant 
P=0.258 
Significant 
P=0.000 
Q18 (Figure A18) Significant 
P=0.000 
Not significant 
P=0.134 
Significant 
P=0.031 
Significant 
P=0.001 
Q20 (Figure A20) Significant 
P=0.000 
Not significant 
P=0.413 
Significant 
P=0.003 
Significant 
P=0.006 
Q22 (Figure A22) Not significant 
P=0.869 
Not significant 
P=0.454 
Not significant 
P=0.511 
Not significant 
P=0.975 
Q23 (Figure A23) Significant 
P=0.001 
Not significant 
P=0.769 
Not significant 
P=0.093 
Not significant 
P=0.414 
Q24 (Figure A24) Not significant 
P=0.439 
Not significant 
P=0.296 
Not significant 
P=0.721 
Not significant 
P=0.408 
Q25 (Figure A25) Not significant 
P=0.364 
Not significant 
P=0.446 
Not significant 
P=0.427 
Not significant 
P=0.234 
Q26 (Figure A26) Significant 
P=0.006 
Not significant 
P=0.661 
Not significant 
P=0.201 
Not significant 
P=0.509 
Q27 (Figure A27) Not significant 
P=0.249 
Not significant 
P=0.614 
Not significant 
P=0.298 
Not significant 
P=0.608 
Q28 (Figure A28) Not significant 
P=0.072 
Not significant 
P=0.661 
Not significant 
P=0.447 
Not significant 
P=0.704 
Q29 (Figure A29) Significant 
P=0.035 
Not significant 
P=0.488 
Not significant 
P=0.079 
Not significant 
P=0.125 
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6 Discussion 
The chapter presents a discussion of the results in relation to the theoretical framework. 
Further, the chapter includes a discussion of differences among member categories. 
 
Individual interest  
Lobbying is generally understood as collective action, the purpose of which is to influence 
decision-makers to make certain decisions (Staatz, 1987; www, ne, 2018). However, to make 
individuals engage in such collective action, the collective objectives must conform to some 
extent with objectives of the individuals (Ostrom 1998; Kirst-Ashman & Hull, 2014). Södra 
invests in lobbying activities to influence decisions, to ensure reasonable conditions for 
Swedish forest owners. This implies that Södra’s members abstain capital to finance the 
lobbying activities, due to the financial structure of cooperatives. When using collective 
funds, the members are forced to renounce a part of the profit that will be used to finance the 
lobbying activities. These investments could cause opposition from the members. 
 
However, based on this study, most members believe that Södra should engage in lobbying 
and that it is better that lobbying is performed collectively than by individuals, even if the 
members must refrain some of the profit. Since the members indicate that they are content 
with the lobbying of Södra, it can be assumed that they identify individual benefits from 
investments in lobbying. Individuals in a collective organisation can still invest in the 
collective if they identify individual benefits (Hardin, 1968). The members of Södra agree in 
general that lobbying influences their forestland in a positive way. For example, increasing 
the value of the forest. It can be assumed that the owner cannot always make independent 
decisions about felling. The lack of felling cause economic loss, hence, affects the value of 
owning forest. Therefore, the individuals have an interest in lobbying activities, even if the 
objective of that activity is collectively decided upon. It can be assumed that one explanation 
for the member’s agreement on lobbying is the balance between individual and collective 
objectives. The collective objective of lobbying is to improve the conditions of forest owner, 
which is of interest for each individual owner. The members also consider that Södra invests 
in relevant issues, which indicate that Södra has found a way of satisfying both individual and 
collective needs.  
 
The need for collective action, such as lobbying, often evolves from social issues (Ostrom, 
1998). The social context could enlighten the imminent positive attitude for lobbying. The 
forestry is a special industry due to many actors involved in it, both actors within the industry 
and actors surrounding it. These actors often have different interests that contradict each other 
and complicates a common solution. Since the members think that their property rights are 
threatened and restricted, they experience need to defend that property right. To be able to 
improve their property rights, they need an advocate to front the interests of forest owners. If 
the forestry industry did not include social issues, the members’ attitude would probably be 
less positive.  
 
Regarding individual interest, there are some differences between member categories. From 
the result, it can be observed that the years of membership positively affect the member’s 
belief in benefits, from letting a cooperative perform the lobbying activities instead of 
individual involvement. Additionally, these members also tend to agree that Södra engages in 
right issues to a higher extent, than the other member categories. The explanation might be 
that the longer the forest owners have been a member of Södra, the more they have invested. 
It can also be observed that members living at their estate permanently perceive that they gain 
benefits in the form of increased value of the forest to a higher extent than those who do not. 
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Social interaction 
Trust is essential for collective action within a large organisation (Adger, 2003). This study 
confirms that the members trust Södra’s management. Trust within the organisation can 
depend on that the members of Södra elect representatives to manage the cooperative. This 
means that the members sense trust for the representatives to consider the members’ interests. 
However, the management cannot always consider the member’s opinions before they make 
decisions. Nevertheless, the members must trust that the management focuses on the 
members’ interests. Since the members trust Södra to promote their interest, they have a 
positive attitude to Södra handling collective funds and invest them in lobbying. If the 
members did not trust Södra, they probably would prefer that the profit is used as individual 
dividends. 
 
In a large cooperative like Södra, social interaction does not only include the relationship 
between members and management but also between the members. Ostrom (1998) discusses 
trust, norms and reciprocity in relation to social interaction. If there is social interaction, the 
membership might be more homogenous. A possible explanation is that the social interaction 
results in members affecting each other and establishing norms. This creates a more 
homogenous membership, which makes it is easier to establish collective objectives. 
Additionally, social interaction results in engagement in the collective organisation, which 
results in the members caring for other members, i.e., the members perceive empathy for the 
others. This implies that if one member is restricted in their forestry, the others are interested 
in supporting the work for helping that member due to social interaction.  
 
Regarding trust, the members’ opinions are related to member categories. The length of the 
membership is a crucial factor. From what can be observed, the trust increases by the length 
of membership. However, there are exceptions from that observation. It could also be 
assumed that the members stay as a member because they have trust in Södra as a cooperative 
and that Södra manages both the members’ interest and the collective funds properly.  
 
Communication 
Ostrom (1998) specifies that communication is important for collective action. This implies 
that Södra must communicate information about current lobbying activities and account for 
the resources used for these activities. The majority of the members are pleased with the 
communication, but not completely satisfied. Hence, they would be more positive about the 
investments if the communication was improved. This indicates that Södra can make 
improvements concerning their communication. Communication may be even more essential 
in a large organisation like Södra since many individuals demand detailed information. If 
Södra did not inform at all about the objectives of the investments, the members would 
probably have a less positive attitude to the lobbying activities.  
 
According to Ostrom (1998), the best way of communication is face to face, but from this 
study, the result shows that the members prefer e-mail instead. It seems though that this 
membership thinks that the most important is that the cooperative provides insight into the 
lobbying activities, not how they do it. Communication can be related to trust, since if Södra 
communicates frequently and properly, the members perceive transparency. Since the 
members’ trust that Södra performs their interests, they do not require as much insight, and 
therefore they might be content with e-mail information. The analyses indicate the member’s 
age affect the opinions about Södra’s communication. From what can be observed in the 
result, the satisfaction regarding communication increases with age.  
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Non-member benefits  
According to Cook and Iliopoulos (1998), free riding implies that individuals reap benefits 
without contributing, based on presupposes self-interest seeking. Lobbying might result in 
non-members receive benefits without contributing to the financing. At the same time, the 
members have difficulties in excluding non-members from receiving such benefits (Hardin, 
1982). Södra cannot exclude other forest owners from receiving the same benefits as the 
members, even if the investments in lobbying are solely financed by the members of Södra.  
 
However, the result from this study indicates that most members of Södra do not consider 
free-riding behaviour as a disincentive to invest in lobbying. Nevertheless, the members’ 
willingness to accept Södra using collective funds for lobbying would not increase if Södra 
could exclude other forest owners from receiving benefits. When engaging in lobbying, Södra 
collaborates with other forestry cooperatives and actors, e.g., Federation of Swedish Family 
Forest Owners and The Swedish Forest Industries Federation. Just as Södra, these 
organisations are member-owned and the lobbying activities financed with collective funds. 
Perhaps, the members’ positive attitude is rooted in Södra’s collaboration with other actors in 
the forestry sector. The members of Södra may consider that other forest owners still 
contribute to the investments in lobbying. It could also be considered that the situation could 
be the opposite. Hence, the members of Södra gain benefits from lobbying activities 
performed by another organisation. Therefore, the members might experience that in some 
issues they contribute to lobbying and in some other cases, they just receive benefits. The 
attitude to lobbying activities dependent on the expected period of the outcome is affected by 
the members’ age. From what can be observed, the older members prefer Södra to focus on 
such business policy issues that deliver results in the near future. 
 
Membership horizon 
Members of a cooperative have limited planning horizons, depending on the expected time of 
the membership (Nilsson, 2011). The horizon of the membership is a possible explanation of 
contradicted shared opinions among Södra’s members regarding whether Södra, in particular, 
should focus on short-term or long-term lobbying strategies. Nevertheless, regardless of 
limited planning horizons, the members are in general positive to investments in lobbying, 
even if it might results in benefits after the membership has ceased. This can be connected to 
the nature of forestry; it is a long-term production, so the members are used to invest in 
something that will pay off in the future. Regardless if the members are supposed to be 
members for many years or if they will finish their membership in the near future, they accept 
that Södra uses collective funds for lobbying activities. This is probably since forest owners 
have cherished their forest for many years, or they plan to do so. Therefore it is important for 
them that the conditions for forestry are reasonable in the future, regardless of the forest 
owner still is a member by that or not. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the result is that the 
oldest and the youngest members tend to believe that Södra should focus on lobbying 
activities that deliver results in the near future. 
 
In general, the forest is a valuable asset and generates profits for the owner. This can explain 
why the expected time of membership in Södra does not result in a negative attitude to long-
term investments. Since lobbying aims to improve conditions for forestry, it can be seen as a 
strategy to preserve or increase the value of the forest and the profitability eventually. 
Restrictions on property rights and unclear conditions for forestry can, on the other hand, have 
a negative effect on the value of the forest and the profitability. Thus, the forest owners 
perceive the investments in lobbying as a less effort, compared to the possible economic 
benefits as can be received from reasonable conditions for forestry. 
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Uncertainty 
The difference in risk preference in a cooperative membership can affect the member’s 
willingness to accept the cooperative’s investments (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). However, due 
to large and heterogeneous membership, all members’ individual risk preferences cannot be 
considered. Therefore, the members are forced to accept a collective risk preference. 
Lobbying is an uncertain investment since it is not possible to evaluate the outcome in 
advance. Besides, it is difficult for a forest owner to determine which investments in lobbying 
activities will affect their forestry. Although, if the profit comes in a far future, the member 
may perhaps not support the collective action (Olson, 1965). However, the uncertainty does 
not create a negative attitude for the investments. Thus, it is not examined if the members 
would support the investments in lobbying activities even more if it were clearer what 
investments affect the private forest estate. The attitude to uncertain lobbying investments is 
dependent on the members’ age. However, it seems like the older members are most positive 
to uncertain investments in lobbying. 
 
Moreover, the members of Södra might not be sensitive to risk, or they consider their 
cooperatives pursuit for reasonable conditions so important that they ignore their individual 
risk preferences. Thus, the member’s might perceive that they gain welfares by trying to 
influence the conditions for forestry, even if it gives any result or not. If the lobbying 
investment does to give the desired result, the forest owners have highlighted their collective 
opinion, which can be valuable. In addition, even if lobbying is an uncertain investment, the 
members are sure to share the profit due to the financial structure of Södra. This means that 
they know that they will receive some dividends, which might explain their positive attitude 
towards Södra investing some of the collective funds.  
 
Member categories 
Most frequently, the age and years of membership constitute sources of differences among the 
membership. Therefore, it is assumed that the membership is heterogeneous in attitude 
towards lobbying; based on the member’s age and years of membership. Especially the 
background variable age occurs in more analysis that indicates significance. By observing the 
summary table (see Table 1), it can be observed that statistical significance is founded on the 
same question when using either one of these background variables. An explanation is that 
age and years of membership are assumed to be related. An older member can be assumed to 
have more years as a member, comparing a younger member. That must not always be the 
case, but it is a possible explanation. 
 
The membership is more similar in response options regarding if there is a successor or not. 
The same applies if the member lives permanently on the estate or not. The interpretation is 
that the membership of Södra is more homogenous in opinion, regardless if they are 
permanently living on the estate or not. A possible explanation is that a forest owner is 
equally interested in the conditions of forestry, independently if they live on the forest estate 
or not. Both alternatives require investments in managing the forest to gain yield and long-
term planning. Therefore, the forest owner desires the same return regardless.  
 
Another thinkable explanation is that Swedish forestry is characterised by family forestry. 
Therefore, it might be assumed that the ownership of forest is associated with sentimental 
values and traditions. If the forest estate is inherited for generations, the owner might value 
the estate in the same way, whether they live nearby or not. The same reasoning might be 
applied if the member has a family member or relative successor. Both these aspects can be 
related to the fact that forestry is a long-term production, and the owner has invested 
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resources into it, and therefore have a positive attitude for improving the conditions of 
forestry. This equates the members with a successor and those who have not, concerning 
incentives to appreciate the lobbying activities of Södra. 
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7 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the study. The chapter describes possible 
explanations to members’ attitude towards investment in lobbying.  
 
The aim of the study is to explore the members’ incentives and disincentives to accept the 
forestry cooperative Södra using its collective funds for lobbying activities. Lobbying is used 
to improve the forestry conditions for Swedish forest owners. This study contains an 
empirical investigation of the members’ attitudes to Södra’s lobbying activities. Their 
appreciation of the collective benefits of the cooperative as well as their view of the collective 
and individual action is observed.  
 
The result can be summarised into following conclusions.  
 
- Most members believe that there are individual benefits from allowing Södra to 
conduct lobbying activities. Besides, the members believe that Södra manages their 
interests in a satisfying way, which can be interpreted that the members’ personal 
interests are catered for within the collective action. The fulfilment of the members’ 
interests constitutes an incentive to accept that collective funds are invested in 
lobbying.  
 
- The members consider that it is better to act on the market as a cooperative than as 
individual forest owners. The members prefer that Södra use collective power to 
influence the forestry policy.  
 
- Social interaction within Södra and the membership creates a positive attitude for 
lobbying activities. This is so because members trust Södra to make investments with 
collective funds on their behalf. It might be possible that social interactions within the 
membership decrease the self-interests and facilitates collective action. Therefore, 
social interactions can increase acceptance of lobbying investments. 
 
- Many members are satisfied with Södra’s communication about the collective 
objectives with the lobbying investments. However, the members would be more 
positive to the investments if Södra communicated even better. Therefore, 
communication can affect the willingness to support lobbying.  
 
- It seems as free riding is not a disincentive for support of investments in lobbying. The 
fact that non-member forest owners do not contribute to the financing of lobbying 
does not affect the members’ attitude towards lobbying. This may be explained by a 
sense of community within various forestry organisations, as well as the financial 
structure of Södra, which implies that members receive dividends even if some of the 
profit is used for investment in lobbying. 
 
- The members of Södra do not consider the membership horizon as an obstacle to long-
term investments in lobbying. This could probably be related to the fact that forestry is 
a long-term production, and the members realise that investments in their forest could 
benefit future forest owners.  
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- The members believe that it is difficult to determine which lobbying issues that affect 
them directly. The overall opinion is that Södra should invest in lobbying, even if the 
investment is risky. Uncertainty, therefore, does not decrease the incentives to accept 
collective investments. The attitude to uncertain investments might be affected by the 
financial structure, since the members receive dividends, even if some profit is used 
for collective investments.  
 
In general, members’ of Södra have a positive attitude towards the co-operative using 
collective funds for financing lobbying activities. Indications from this study are that the 
members think that there is a need for influencing the development of the forestry 
industry. The findings are valuable for Södra since it means that the members appreciate 
the investments in lobbying activities. In addition, the study provides awareness that the 
large group of members is not always cohesive, especially when it comes to age and years 
of membership. The proof of the members’ acceptance and the positive attitude might be 
useful as marketing to attract new members or maintain current ones, but also improve 
Södra’s position in the forestry industry and collaboration with other actors.  
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Appendix 1 Cover letter 
English version 
 
Dear member of Södra, 
 
Södra collaborates with two agronomist students at Swedish University of Agricultural 
Sciences who write an exam thesis concerning lobbying and the business policy activities of 
Södra. 
 
Below, you can find a link to the survey, made by students and we kindly ask you to fill in 
and send it back. The questionnaire is self-instructing and takes about ten minutes to fill in.  
 
I hope you will take this opportunity to fill out the questionnaire and by that, support the 
students in their final thesis and at the same time provide valuable insight to the business 
policy activities of Södra. 
 
Click here to participate in the study 
 
Regards, 
 
Gustav Tibblin, Officer of Member Relations 
 
Swedish version 
 
Bästa Södramedlem, 
Södra samarbetar med två agronomstudenter på Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet som håller på 
med ett examensarbete om näringspolitik och Södras näringspolitiska arbete. 
Nedan finner ni en länk till en enkät som studenterna tagit fram och som vi vill be er att fylla i 
och skicka in. Enkäten är självinstruerande och tar ca 10 minuter att fylla i. 
Jag hoppas ni har möjlighet att fylla i enkäten och på så vis både stötta studenterna i deras 
examensarbete och samtidigt ge värdefulla inspel till Södras näringspolitiska arbete. 
Klicka här för att komma till enkäten 
Med vänlig hälsning, 
Gustav Tibblin, Medlemschef 
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Appendix 2 Cover letter 
 
English version 
Dear member of Södra, 
We collaborate with Södra in our exam thesis about the business policy activities of Södra. 
You have been randomly selected by the members of Södra, to participate in our survey and 
we truly hope that you have the possibility to help us by answering some short questions. The 
survey regards your membership, and you will answer from your perspective as a member. 
The participation is of course voluntary.  
The purpose of Södra’s business policy activities is to take charge of the members economic 
interests by defending the property right and the possibility of forest owners to freely manage 
their forest under reasonable conditions. Södra uses the collective funds of the cooperative to 
finance the business policy activities, and we are therefore interested in your opinion as a 
member regarding this investment.  
The creators of this survey are Matilda Helgeson and Ellinor Svensson, and we study to 
become agronomists at SLU, The Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. This survey is 
a part of our exam thesis, and it is performed in collaboration with Södra. By answering the 
survey, you will contribute to the development of Södra’s business policy activities.  
You will answer some questions and take a stand to several statements. Your answers are 
completely anonymous. The survey is expected to take about ten minutes. The survey will be 
open during nine days from when you receive this mail.  
Thanks in advance for your participation! 
Should there occur any questions, please contact us, 
Matilda Helgesson, 070- 210 59 98 mahn0015@stud.slu.se   
Ellinor Svensson, 073- 097 42 43 elsn0002@stud.slu.se   
Jerker Nilsson, professor and supervisor, 070- 728 85 16 jerker.nilsson@slu.se     
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Swedish version 
Hej, 
Vi arbetar tillsammans med Södra med ett examensarbete om Södras näringspolitiska arbete. 
Du har blivit slumpvis utvald bland Södras medlemmar för att delta i vår undersökning och vi 
hoppas verkligen att du har möjlighet att hjälpa oss genom att svara på några korta frågor. 
Undersökningen avser ditt medlemskap och du svarar utifrån ditt perspektiv som medlem. 
Deltagandet är naturligtvis frivilligt. 
Södras syfte med det näringspolitiska arbetet är att tillvarata medlemmarnas ekonomiska 
intressen genom att försvara äganderätten och skogsägarnas möjlighet att fritt bruka sin skog 
under rimliga villkor. Södra använder föreningens medel för att finansiera det näringspolitiska 
arbetet och därför är vi intresserade av att veta vad du som medlem anser om denna 
investering. 
Vi som gör denna undersökning heter Matilda Helgesson och Ellinor Svensson. Vi studerar 
till ekonom-agronomer vid SLU, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet. Studien är en del i vårt 
examensarbete och görs i samarbete med Södra. Genom att svara på enkäten bidrar du till att 
Södra kan utveckla sitt näringspolitiska arbete. 
Du kommer att få svara på en del frågor samt ta ställning till ett antal påståenden. Dina svar är 
helt anonyma. Undersökningen förväntas ta max 10 min. Enkäten är öppen att besvara under 
nio dagar från det att detta mail skickas.  
Stort tack på förhand för ditt deltagande! 
Skulle det uppstå frågor är du varmt välkommen att kontakta oss, 
Matilda Helgesson, 070- 210 59 98 mahn0015@stud.slu.se  
Ellinor Svensson, 073- 097 42 43 elsn0002@stud.slu.se  
Jerker Nilsson, professor och handledare, 070- 728 85 16 jerker.nilsson@slu.se       
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Appendix 3 Questionnaire 
 
 
Figure A1. Gender 
 
 
Figure A2. Age 
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Figure A3. Hectares 
 
 
Figure A4. Production orientation 
 
 
Figure A5. Living permanently at the estate 
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Figure A6. If there is a successor or not 
 
 
Figure A7. Years of membership 
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Figure A8. Geographical area 
 
 
Figure A9. Before you received the introduction letter, did you know that Södra engages in 
business policy activities? 
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Figure A10. Has your forestry ever been obstructed by outsiders i.e., agencies or 
associations? 
 
 
Figure A12. Södra should engage in business policy activities. 
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Figure A13. Södra does a better business policy work than individual forest owners can do. 
 
 
Figure A14a. How important are the different business policy issues to you? 
 
 
Figure A14b. How important are the different business policy issues to you? 
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Figure A14c. How important are the different business policy issues to you? 
 
 
Figure A14d. How important are the different business policy issues to you? 
 
 
Figure A14e. How important are the different business policy issues to you? 
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Figure A14f. How important are the different business policy issues to you? 
Figure A15. Södra's efforts in business policy provide benefits to me through, for example, an 
increased value of my forest property. 
61 
Figure A16. For Södra to invest in business policy, the questions must be important to me, 
e.g., such as increases the value of my forest.
Figure A17. It is good that Södra invests in business policy because Södra engages in the 
issues that are important to me. 
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Figure A18. I trust that Södra manages my interests regarding business policy. 
Figure A19a. How do you experience the discussion climate in Södra? 
Figure A19b. How do you experience the discussion climate in Södra? 
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Figure A19c. How do you experience the discussion climate in Södra? 
Figure A20. My trust in Södra and my relationship with the members make me more positive 
about Södra investing in business policy. 
64 
Figure A21. How do you prefer to get information about which business policy issues that 
Södra is working with? 
Figure A22. If Södra informed better about business policy, I would be more positive. 
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Figure A23. The information about Södra's objectives with business policy is sufficient. 
Figure A24. Södra should invest in business policy, although it may benefit other forest 
owners who do not contribute to the investments. 
66 
Figure A25. If the results of business policy only benefit Södra's members, I would be more 
positive. 
Figure A26. In particular, Södra should focus on such business policy issues that deliver 
results in the near future. 
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Figure A27. Södra should invest in business policy even if the result is achieved after my 
membership has ceased. 
Figure A28. It is difficult to determine which business policy issues that affect my forestry. 
68 
Figure A29. Södra should work with business policy, although it is difficult to know how the 
outcome will be. 
Figure A30. Do you have any comments or anything else you would like to contribute? 
